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Two aims drive this essay. The first is to provide the reader with an accessible, yet relatively comprehensive, introduction to Roberto Mangabeira Unger's social and legal theory. The second aim is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Unger's most recent scholarship and to make some suggestions as to where he goes awry. In particular, the author draws several parallels between the Ungerian enterprise and that of some feminists. The central motivation of the essay is to keep the critical conversation between male radicals and feminists open. To this end, the author posits the possibility of mutually beneficial contributions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Two· basic purposes underlie this review. The first is an 
attempt to provide an accessible, yet reasonably comprehensive, 
introduction to the social a_nd legal theory of Roberto Mangabeira 
Unger, particularly as it is developed in his recently published three 
volume series Politics: A Work in Constrnctive Social Theory. The 
second purpose is to evaluate both the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Ungerian enterprise and, more particularly, to indicate where, in 
my opinion, he has gone wrong. In pursuing the latter, I will draw 
upon the contributions of recent feminist social theory.2 
2 A caveat must be introduced at the outset. I am very conscious of the dangers involved in a process in which a man discusses feminism. What follows, I hope, is neither masculinist ventriloquism nor imperial scholarship. Richard Delgado describes the latter as white (or, in this case, male) analysis that is built upon "factual ignorance or naivete, ... failure of empathy, and inability to share values, desires and perspectives of the population whose rights are under consideration." See ''The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature" (1984) 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561 at 568. In the light of these concerns, let me cautiously say that what is said in this paper is not said as a feminist because I am not 
/ 
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To achieve these aims, the essay is divided into six subsections. 
In Part II, I will attempt to provide a political and philosophical 
backdrop for Unger's work in order to indicate the nature of the 
problem that he and others - feminists, for example - are 
attempting to come to terms with. This I call the Paradox· of the 
Twilightenment. In Part III, I provide a self-contained overview of 
each of the three books that make up Politics. Part IV outlines 
some political and philosophical points of intersection between 
Unger and elements of the feminist enterprise and suggests the 
viability of a fruitful interchange. On this foundation, Part V 
provides several examples of the way in which critical theory a la 
Unger may be of some utility for feminist reconstruction. Part VI, 
on the other hand, identifies, from a feminist perspective, some of 
the very serious weaknesses of U nger's theory as developed in 
Politics and makes some suggestions as to how they might be 
remedied. The conclusion returns to a brief discussion of why it 
may be worthwhile facilitating an exchange between feminist and 
Ungerian social theory. 
IL A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: A SNAPSHOT OF 
THE TWILIGHTENMENT 
A. The Paradox of Freedom Embedded in Domination 
Our post-industrial, patriarchal condition disconcerts because 
it disempowers. Many of us are disempowered because our society 
has been unable to resolve the tension between freedom and 
equality on the one hand, and domination and subordination on the 
other, in a manner that allows all of us to fulfill our potentials as 
human beings. Put differently, a fundamental problem with 
contemporary society is that some people's freedom is the cause of 
sure if it is possible - or desirable - for a man to be feminist. Yet at the same time, I do believe that it is legitimate for men to enter into conversations with feminists, and that such conversations can be for their mutual benefit. For a further discussion of this issue, see "Nomos and Thanatos (Part A). The Killing Fields: Modern Law and Legal Theory" (1989) 12 Dal L.J. 297 and "Nomos and Thanatos (Part B). Feminism as Jurisgenerative Transformation or Resistance Through Partial Incorporation?" (1990) 13 Dal. L.J. (forthcoming) (hereinafter Nomos and Thanatos (Part B)]. 
" 
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other people's subordination. This I call the Paradox of the 
Twilightenment. 
Those of us who inhabit the rich Euro-yanqui societies confront 
an existential paradox: when we compare our cultural situation with 
those of the Third World and of communist societies, it appears that 
in relation to the bench-marks of freedom and domination we are 
ahead all the way. However, when we begin to seriously reflect 
upon our everyday realities, the finer textures of our intimate and 
civic relations, a discomforting feeling of unfulfillment begins to 
emerge. When we critically evaluate our interpersonal relations, 
whether in the realms of employment or our more vulnerable 
connections, it becomes apparent that domination and subordination, 
hierarchy and dependence, privilege and inequality are more 
pervasive than we might want to admit, and are, perhaps, even 
constitutive. Moreover, when we examine our political lives it seems 
that, in the main, our participation is minimal and our impact 
marginal. Freedom, although much touted, is seldom seen. It is 
more closely related to our ability as consumers to purchase, than it 
is to effective democratic participation in the polity. 
Thus, the normalcy of our societies, although superficially 
attractive when compared to what else appears to be available, is on 
closer inspection profoundly disturbing. It obscures the per­
vasiveness of domination, subordination, inequality, and harm 
through an ideology of freedom - an apologetic ideology that 
rationalizes domination, rather than challenging it. Several of the 
pieces I am currently working on are attempts to interrogate these 
connections between domination and subordination and to raise the 
possibility of theory and practice that could be otherwise to make 
freedom and domination, not only antithetical, but also incompatible. 
B. Theses of the Enlightenment 
Protest about the impoverished state of our contemporary 
context, although necessary, is an inadequate foundation for social 
transformation. As feminism demonstrates, consciousness is not 
changed circumstances. The experiential disillusionment is only one 
facet of problems that run much deeper, problems which, I think, 
can be traced to the politico-philosophical roots of western, liberal 
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democratic society. I want to suggest that three interrelated ideas 
which inspired the project of the Enlightenment have contributed 
to our failure to uncouple domination and freedom. The project of 
progressive actors must be to transcend these pervasive ideas, to 
demonstrate how the noble dream of the Enlightenment has become 
the nightmare of the Twilightenment, and to work towards a vision 
for the reconstruction of the nature and relations of human 
interactions. 
The three central ideas that are integral to the project of the 
Enlightenment are: (1) the priority of the right over the good, with 
the correlative underemphasis on construction of desirable societies; 
(2) an excessive concern with the autonomy of the individual, at the 
expense of her ·constitutive connections with others; and (3) a 
correlative of the former two, a relativism or scepticism about how 
we could live better lives, both individually and together. 
C. The Three "D's" 
The scepticism sponsored by the Enlightenment has had the 
deleterious effect of what might be called the three "D's": 
distraction, despondence, and disempowennent. By distraction, I mean 
the seemingly irrepressible dynamic for those of us who live in 
technologically sophisticated societies to adapt, invent, and consume 
gadgetry that, in and of itself or as a medium for some other 
vicarious activity, will allow us to continue our collectively self­
imposed myopia. Distraction contributes to the cult of self­
fulfillment,3 thereby inducing political impotence. Despondence is 
interconnected with distraction in so far as the latter suggests the 
limits of the good life and the pacification of our capacity to be 
socially involved. It goes beyond distraction in that it is a 
consequence of a resignation to our apparent puniness in relation to 
the great world events. The fatalistic tendencies of such a stance 
result in what might be called the political can't. Disempowerment 
is the politico-psychological consequence of distraction and 
despondence. It is a feeling of political irrelevance or marginality, 
3 False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) at 543ff. (hereinafter False Necessity]. 
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a denial of our creative abilities as human beings, an unjustifiable 
surrender to the fallacy that the actual is the inevitable. 
To summarize, the foregoing discussion of the three tenets of 
the Enlightenment, in combination with the three 11D's, 11 provides us 
with a snapshot of what some call "the post-modern condition."4 It 
is what I call the Twilightenment with its fundamental contradiction: 
the embeddedness of domination in freedom. 
III. POLITICS 
All is not gloom and doom, however. I do believe that there 
1s still space for reconstruction and an escape from the 
Twilightenment. I find traces of this hope in both feminism and 
critical theory. In this review, I want to focus my thoughts through 
a critical overview of Unger's most recent three volumes, but filtered 
through the critical prism of feminist analysis.5 
Unger is important for at least two reasons. Although he is a 
law professor at Harvard, his scholarship and activities have had an 
impact far beyond the legal community. Since 1975 he has 
published seven books,6 some of which when reviewed have been 
4 J.-F. Lyotard, The Post Modem Condition: A Repon on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984). 5 A second caveat concerning feminism must be identified. Although I use the terms 
feminism and feminist, I am of course aware that there are many feminisms and feminists and that they can not be reduced to a unified essentialist group. Indeed, one of the biggest debates with feminism - at least of the academic variety - is the question of whether there is a series of commonalities between all feminists, in spite of their differences, or whether feminism, because of its consciousness of difference, is better understood as a radical pluralism. See, generally, the last several issues of Signs. Having said that, I do think that at the present historical moment there are a series of themes that are common to many feminists, and it is upon these that I draw: see S. Farganis, The Social Reconstruction of the 
Feminine Character (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986). 
6 Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1975) [hereinafter Knowledge]; Law in 
Modem Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory (New York: Free Press, 1976) [hereinafter 
Law in Modem Society]; Passion: An Essay on Personality (New York: Free Press, 1984) [hereinafter Passion]; The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986) [hereinafter Critical Legal Studies]; Social Theory: Its Situation and its 
Task (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) (hereinafter Social Theory]; False 
Necessity, supra, note 3; Plasticity into Power: Comparative-Historical Studies on the Institutional 
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compared - favourably and unfavourably - with Kant, Hegel, and 
Marx. At the age of thirty-nine, he may well have established 
himself as one of the most important thinkers of the late twentieth 
century. Secondly, Unger has aligned himself with and has been 
pivotal to the emergence of the Critical Legal Studies Movement. 
Crits get a lot of bad press as nihilists, trashers, and jurisprudential 
anarchists who can critique but do little to suggest how things might 
be improved. To some extent that is true. Unger, however, goes 
beyond critique. The three volumes reviewed in this essay are his 
most coherent efforts to date. The subtitle to Politics is: "A Work 
in Constructive Social Theory." And I think they have much to 
offer. 
A Social Theory: Its Situation and its Task 
Social Theory is, perhaps, the most inaccessible of the three 
volumes, at least for lawyers. However, I want to emphasize at the 
outset that the difficulty should not be identified as the predictable 
scholarly ruminations and philosophical flights of fantasy of a 
nameless academic at  an elite university. Rather, the source of the 
unfamiliarity is to be located in the enormity of the enterprise upon 
which Unger embarks. By drawing on his own prehistory, his 
acknowledged failure to have a progressive impact upon Brazilian 
politics in the mid 1980s, Unger attempts to come to terms with the 
question of why contemporary ideas and ideology (for example, 
Marxism) fail to provide the requisite inspiration and motivation -
not to mention feasible strategies - for transformative political 
praxis. He argues that such an inquiry, if serious, requires a 
sweeping critical reflection upon, not only the politics of the late 
twentieth century, for that would only scratch the surface, but also 
our received epistemological traditions. For Unger, knowledge and 
politics are mutually constitutive. The viability of a transgressive 
· politics that can serve as an alternative to both liberalism and 
communism is dependent upon a reconceptualization of knowledge. 
As he suggests, we must work towards "another way of seeing and 
Conditions of Economic and Military Success (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 
(hereinafter Plasticity]. 
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talking."7 Thus, the difficulty of his work is explained by the 
essential nature of the enterprise.8 
Primarily, Social Theory is a critical analysis of the 
methodologies, paradigms, practices, and, most importantly, the 
deeply embedded assumptions of contemporary social theory. 
Unger's overarching thesis is that conventional wisdom and 
knowledge are structurally disempowering. He proceeds to found 
this claim on the argument that over the last several centuries our 
greatest thinkers and social movements9 have all operated, explicitly 
or implicitly, on an assumption of what he variously calls 
"inevitability," "naturalism," or "necessitarianism." That is, they tend 
to see science, human nature, and our social, economic, and political 
relations as having certain characteristics that are fixed, immutable, 
or permanent. The reason why such a viewpoint is disempowering 
is that it suggests that there is a certain natural order that is pre­
ordained and unchallengeable and therefore immune from human 
intervention. The consequence is "intellectual entropy, ... social 
stagnation,"10 "frozen politics,"11 and a "perpetuation of the 
conditions of hierarchy ... dependence and domination."12 
Unger provides a variety of examples of the repressive impact 
of necessitarianism on natural science ( cosmology and natural 
7 Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 130. 8 Alexandra Dobrowolsky has suggested to me a second reason why Unger's work may appear difficult, a reason that relates more to the reader than the author. Referring to feminist literary criticism, Dobrowolsky suggests that we tend to read in one of two different modes: as "text-rubbers" or as "data-gatherers." Our style of reading, in this view, tends to be functionally specific effecting an intellectual division of labour between the recreational/pleasurable and the labourial/instrumental. We tend to use one or the other depending on the context and the subject matter. They are functionally dichotomous. For some readers, it may be that the interpretive problem with Unger is that his style of writing requires both text-rubbing and data-gathering simultaneously, an ability we find difficult to develop, especially for lawyers who are deliberately trained to generate data and eliminate verbiage. For a further discussion of the importance of language, see False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 430-32. 91n particular, he identifies three "great secular doctrines of emancipation: liberalism, socialism and communism." See Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 1 .  
lO Ibid. at 2. 
1l Ibid. at 11 .  
12 Ibid. at 1 .  
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history), positivist and empiricist social science, economics, 
epistemology, and historiography. However, perhaps surprising to 
some, he expends his greatest efforts on Marxist theory and 
communist practice. He posits that the reason why traditional 
communism has failed is because of Marxism's deep structural, 
necessitarian belief in economic determinism, that is, the credo that 
human emancipation will be achieved after the revolution 
necessitated by the economic polarization inherent in capitalism. 
From Unger's perspective, the problem with this analysis is fourfold. 
Firstly, Marx's central concept - capitalism - is conceptually flawed, 
being simultaneously over and under inclusive. It explains both too 
little and too much of world history. Secondly, the Marxian analysis 
of an inexorable, discrete, and lawlike sequence of modes of 
production ( each with their own supposedly unique set of internal 
laws) is descriptively inaccurate and explanatorily deficient. Thirdly, 
the Marxist faith in revolution is misplaced, desperate, and 
disempowering, for it is dependent upon "government shattering 
events like war and occupation,"13 unlikely scenarios for the rich 
North Atlantic societies. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, 
these theoretical errors have had disastrous practical consequences 
in that the belief in economically determined inevitability, with its 
assumption of an incorrigible typecast script, tends to render 
irrelevant the political and imaginative significance of human agency. 
Thus, for Unger, knowledge is political to its core in so far as its 
unquestioned assumptions - in this case historical materialism's 
deeply embedded necessitarian premise that "there is a pre­
established plot to social and historical life"14 - have a dramatic 
impact upon the issues identified, the questions asked, the 
methodologies invoked, the answers sought, and the practices 
generated. 
Unger is quick to point out, though, that the rejection of 
"necessitarian illusions" does not inevitably result in "nihilistic 
l3 Ibid. at 164. 
l4 Ibid. at 136. 
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impotence"15 or "intellectual or political abdication."16 To the 
contrary, he argues that by means of this critique we can begin to 
unpack the parameters and possibilities of a reconstructive agenda.17 
Politics is a "polemic with a constructive point."18 For example, 
although he is extremely critical of the necessitarian impulses of "a 
dead man's doctrines,"19 he also recognizes that there already exists 
within Marx's enterprise "the beginnings of an antidote,"20 the 
rudiments of political and epistemological reconstruction: 
Marx stated the relation between enlightenment and emancipation from false necessity in the most powerful and uncompromising way. The social world was not a natural order, but a domain of collective struggle, constraint, and acceptance. The material relations of society were real relationships of domination and dependence among people. The whole structure of society was the expression of temporary constraints and particular contests rather than part of the inherent nature of things. Economic growth, which had once required oppression, would soon make it superfluous. The role of social thought, as an accomplice of emancipatory social practice, was to demystify society and to reveal it to itself.21 
Where Marx and Marxists had gone wrong was to turn historical 
materialism into a positivistic science, thereby unconsciously 
deradicalizing its emancipatory potential. 
The primary purpose therefore of the first volume of Politics 
is to strive towards the evocation and articulation of an alternative 
conception of knowledge and politics. Unger argues that naturalism 
is, in fact, a hangover from the pre-modern - the ancient and/or 
feudalistic worlds with their notions of status, closure," 
foundationalism, and essentialism. Modernism, however, rejects such 
a static and scripted viewpoint of the world and adopts as its central 
15 Ibid. at 137. 
16 Ibid. at 149. 
17 Unger does recognize that there are certain social critics, for example Foucault, who would agree with much of his critique, but who would equally virulently reject his reconstructive agenda as a capitulation to metatheory. Though he does not trash these "ultra­theorists," he does accuse them of "unrestrained negativism." Ibid. at 165-70, 150 . . 
lB Ibid. at 200. 
19 Ibid. at 99. 
20 Ibid. at 229. 
21 Ibid. at 138. 
( 
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theme the challengeability of all assumptions and the constructed 
and non-permanent nature of social interaction.22 The difference 
can be schematized as follows: 









apo Ii tical/non-con testable 
disempowerment 









it's all politics/it's all up for 
grabs 
empowerment 
However, we must be careful not to understand the foregoing 
schematization as a mere exercise in reversal and inversion, the 
simple replacement or elimination of historical necessity by historical 
contingency. That would be to commit the fatal error of "denying 
the reality of constraint,"23 and thereby succumbing to the myopia of 
naive voluntarism. Rather, what is contemplated is a 
reconceptualization of both necessitarianism and contingency and 
their mutual relationship, a consciousness that the distinction is 
relative, not absolute - a continuum and not a dichotomy. The 
distinction is therefore still important, but now for very different 
reasons.24 I will return to this point in the next section where I 
22 In fact, in this volume Unger goes further to develop the outline of an alternative explanatory social theory, one that recognizes the distinction between "formative contexts and formed routines," but one which, at the same time, denies any necessary permanence to the former and posits that the distinction between contexts and routines is relative, not absolute. See ibid. at 151-52. For the purposes of this review, I think it is appropriate to reserve a discussion of these ideas to the next section where he develops these thoughts in much greater detail. 
23 Ibid. at 173. 
24 Unger makes this point most explicitly through his discussions of natural science. 
Ibid., c. 7. 
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discuss his theory of "formative contexts and formed routines. 1125 To 
summarize, Unger sees himself as the archmodernist, a latter-day 
crusader who, through his espousal of contextualism,26 wants to take 
11the idea of society as artifact to the hilt"27 and thereby to 
emancipate us from the shackles of "false necessity." 
Supplementing and driving the first two themes of Social Theory 
- the critique of the naturalistic predicament of contemporary social 
theory and the evocation of a contextual anti-necessitarian 
alternative - there is a third motivating theme, what Unger describes 
as the "radical project." Here, Unger's aspiration is that we become 
"the architects and critics, rather than the puppets, of the social 
worlds in which we live."28 It is tailored to enable us "to seek out 
our individual and collective empowerment through the progressive 
dissolution of rigid social division and hierarchy and stereotyped 
social roles. "29 
In a previous work, Passion, 30 Unger traced out a theory of 
human nature that runs parallel to many of the themes in Politics. 
In that work, Unger argued that we are not passive automatons of 
our contexts, that our genius and specificity as human beings is to 
be located in our "nega-tive capability," that is, our ability to revise 
and/or transcend every constraining context that is foisted upon us. 
The history of humankind is the history of breach of context. The 
problem with contexts is that they have a propensity to ossify. They 
tend to take on a logic and dynamic of their own which, in turn, 
conflates the actual with the possible. This process of rigidification 
conflicts with and attempts to imprison our negative capability. 
Worse still, the stasis induced by the solidification of contexts 
25 See section 111.B, infra at 655ff. 
26 Unger also makes the important point that a modern social theory must be a contextual social theory, one that recognizes the partiality of its own context, one that is conscious of its own transience. As I will suggest later, this viewpoint may cause him more problems than he recognizes. See also, M. Minow, ''Partial Justice: Law and Minorities" (1988) [unpublished manuscript]. 
27 Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 1. 
28 Ibid. at 156. 
29 Ibid. at 93. 
3o Supra, note 6. 
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becomes identified as the natural order by those who exercise power 
and privilege. It is therefore utilized to reinforce and legitimize 
conditions of inequality, hierarchy, and subordination. An anti­
necessitarian social theory is designed to undercut the political and 
philosophical feasibility of such preservative apologetics, so that 
everything - including our interpretive assumptions - is "up for 
grabs." The Ungerian aspiration is that each and every one of us 
may have the possibility "to live as the originals as [we] all feel 
[ourselves] to be"31 and achieve our aspirations free from the 
constraints of illegitimate hierarchy. This Unger calls "empowerment 
through disentrenchment. 1132 
Thus, Unger's ambition, as traced out in the first volume of 
Politics, is large: to interrogate, transcend, and replace one 
conception of the world with another. Moreover, the articulation of 
a radical, anti-necessitarian explanatory social theory is designed to 
go "hand in hand"33 with a more important project: the outline of 
a post-Marxist34 programme for social . reconstruction. This 
programme, which is outlined in the second volume, is designed to 
nullify the traditional liberal accusation of deconstructive nihilism, by 
offering a realizable "vision of alternative institutional forms"35 that 
can transcend the achievements, such as they are, of liberalism, 
communism, and social democracy. Theory and practice, knowledge 
and politics remain at the core of the Ungerian agenda, for as he 
argues time and again, "it is all politics. 1136 
31 Ibid. at 214. 
32 False Necessity, supra, note 3 al 249. 
33 Social Theory, supra, note 6 al 6. 
34 It is also post-liberal and post-social democratic. 
35 Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 6. 
36 Unger elaborates on what he means by this in a footnote: Throughout this book and its constructive sequel I use the term "politics" in both a narrower and a broader sense. The narrower sense is the conflict over the mastery and uses of governmental power. The broader sense is the conflict over the terms of our practical and passionate relations to one another and over all the resources and assumptions that may influence these terms. Preeminent among these assumptions are the institutional arrangements and imaginative preconceptions that compose a social framework, context or structure. Governmental politics is only a special case of politics in this larger sense. In a theory that carries to extremes the view of society as artifact, 
) 
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B. False Necessity: Anti-Necessita,ian Social Theory in the Service 
of Radical Democracy 
This six hundred and fifty page book provides us with the core 
of Unger's reconstructive agenda. It begins with a rehearsal of the 
ideas of the first, more theoretical volume - this time describing it 
as ii "proto-theory"37 - and then proceeds to concretize and 
elaborate through an impressive panoply of historical examples. This 
volume has two parts: one analytic and explanatory of societies of 
the past and present; the other programmatic and suggestive of the 
future. Between them they are designed to ensure that we do not 
fall prey to "the hallucinatory identification of the actual with the 
necessary."38 
1. Explanatory: determinism vs. formative contexts 
In the explanatory part, Unger provides us with an account of 
the patterns of social interaction that is not dependent upon theories 
of necessitarianism. Rather, in order to provide a "corrective to a 
contrived sense of natural progression,"39 he argues that we ean only 
fully understand our past and our present if we see them through 
what he calls a theory of "formative context." He defines formative 
contexts as "the basic institutional arrangements and imaginative 
preconceptions that circumscribe our routine practical or imaginative 
activities and conflicts and that resist their destabilizing effects.1140 
The reason why we would want to comprehend the significance of 
this larger notion of politics merges into the conception of society making. The slogan "It's all politics" adds a further twist to this more inclusive idea. The additional twist is the notion that this society-making activity follows no preestablished plot and that its outcomes are not chiefly to be understood as the results of lawlike economic, organizational, and psychological constraints or overpowering developmental tendencies. 
Ibid. at 10. 
37 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 32. 
38 Ibid. at 291. 
39 Ibid. at 214. 
4o Ibid. at 6-7. 
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formative contexts is because of their interconnection with the power 
order of any society. Formative contexts underpin both the 
possibility and the processes of politics because they provide certain 
grqups with "a privileged measure of control over the means of 
society making: mastery over capital and productive labor, access to 
governmental power, and familiarity with the discourses by which we 
reimagine society and govern nature."41 
Through a discussion of the Ancient City State Republics, 
agrarian-bureaucratic empires, world history, his native Brazil of the 
1980s, and, most elaborately, the post-war cycles of reform and 
retrenchment of both western and communist societies, Unger argues 
that each can only be explained if we see them as a unique 
combination of peculiar social forces, none of which can be reduced 
to one determinative, overarching, totalistic, ahistorical imperative. 
Thus, for example, he is critical of liberalism in that it assumes that 
there is a necessary connection between private property, a free 
market, freedom of the individual, democracy, and equality. I will 
return to this example below. 
We must be very careful not to misunderstand Unger's claims 
about his theory of formative contexts. His argument is not simply 
a reversal of the argument that everything is immutable and 
inevitable. The theory of formative contexts recognizes that there 
are constraining structures that circumscribe our lived routines,42 but 
it also recognizes that no ·context is total and that the difference 
between contexts and routine is relative, not absolute. His ambition 
is to change the very meaning of contexts, not just their content, but 
also their character, to disconnect them from their essentialist 
assumptions, to diminish their "imprisoning quality," and to make 
them more open to transience than fixity: 
We can never resolve the tension between the need to accept a context and the inadequacy of all particular contexts. We can nevertheless diminish this tension by our success at inventing contexts that give us the instruments and opportunities of their own 
41 Ibid. at 33. 
42 Indeed, elsewhere he appears to accept the appropriateness of contexts when he discusses what he calls "the paradox of contextuality: our need to settle down to a particular context and our inability to accept any context in particular as fully satisfactory." Ibid. at 342. 
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revision and that thereby help us diminish the contrast between context-preserving 
routine and context-transforming struggle.43 
Therefore, Unger is not calling for the elimination of contexts,44 for 
that would be utopian. Rather, he is attempting to conceive of 
"constraint without deep structure"45 and to provide us with a "scale 
of revisability"46 that can allow us to evaluate the different structures 
according to the extent to which they provide for their own 
remaking and their consequential openness to human empowerment: 
Formative contexts differ not only in content but in character: that is to say, in their 
relative degree of entrenchment or immunity to disturbance. The more entrenched 
they are, the sharper become the contrasts they establish and uphold between routine 
and transformation and the steeper, more rigid, and more influential the social divisions 
and hierarchies to which they give rise. Formative contexts enjoy degrees of existence. 
This variation matters: the disentrenchment of formative contexts is bound up with 
many of our most basic efforts at individual and collective empowerment.47 
Consequently, in the Ungerian scheme of things, the institutions and 
ideologies of liberal bourgeois democracies are more preferable than 
those of European absolutist monarchies because they are more 
open to self-revision. By exactly the same measure - i.e., the "scale 
of revisability" - his unfolding project of empowered democracy is 
preferable to liberal bourgeois democracies in so far as the latter 
still bear the mark of naturalism.48 
Unger concretizes these rather abstract reflections on the 
nature of formative contexts through a discussion of some of the 
institutional components of the formative context of western 
democracies. He argues that there are four basic institutional 
elements of the formative context of late twentieth century western 
43 Ibid. at 32. 44 He identifies such a position with "negativistic, existentialist creed" and ultra-theory. Ibid. at 98. 45 Ibid. at 170. 46 Ibid. at 35. 47 Ibid. at 61. 48 Ibid. at 280. Unger provides a variation of this thesis in a later, parallel argument. 
In the course of a discussion on the rigidity of differing social hierarchies, he suggests that 
"[c]lass hierarchy is not the sole exemplary form of social hierarchy" and indeed that the caste 
and the estate are even more ensconced. Ibid. at 306-7. 
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democracies: the work-organization complex, the private-rights 
complex, the governmental-organization complex, and the 
occupational-structure complex.49 Together these interrelated 
complexes coalesce into a sort of matrix that sets the terrain and 
parameters of social interaction, not only institutionally, but also 
imaginatively.50 They become a presupposed backdrop that sets the 
scene for our mutual interaction. Thus, for example, the work­
organization complex generates an assumption that the appropriate 
mode of labour relations is one that accepts a rigid dichotomy 
between "task-definition" and "task-execution." In this view, directors 
control and determine the fortune of a commercial enterprise, while 
the employees merely fulfill their appointed tasks. This is widely 
49 Ibid. at 69-79. Note, however, that Unger is careful to point out that this list is not 
exclusive and that, in particular, it does not include any of the imaginative components of a 
formative context. Ibid. at 68-69. Later he posits that: 
The core idea is that a formative context includes, together with major institutional 
settlements, a moral geography of social life: a conception of how people can and 
should deal with one another in the different fields of social practice. Sometimes, this 
scheme of social life consists in a single, overpowering model of sociability, meant to 
be repeated as a theme and variations throughout social life. In other cultures, by 
contrast, the authoritative scheme of human association assumes the form of distinct 
models of sociability, each set in contrast to the others. Thus, the most influential 
preconceptions about sociability prevailing in the contemporary North Atlantic 
democracies assign radically different standards of human association to government, 
family life, and economic activity. 
Ibid. at 101-2. 
SO For example: 
In the contemporary Western democracies the social framework includes legal rules 
that use property rights as the instrument of economic decentralization, constitutional 
arrangements that provide for representation while discouraging militancy, and a style 
of business organization that starkly contrasts task-defining and task-executing activities. 
In the industrial democracies the formative structure of social life also incorporates a 
series of models of human association that are expected to be realized in different areas 
of social existence: a model of private community applying to the life of family and 
friendship, a model of democratic organization guiding the activities of governments and 
political parties, and a model of private contract combined with impersonal technical 
hierarchy addressing the prosaic realm of work and exchange. 
Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 3. 
The reader may at this point detect a possible contradiction. In the previous footnote, 
I indicated that Unger seemed to say that he was not dealing with the imaginative elements 
of a formative context. Now, however, he appears to be saying that institutions have 
imaginative repercussions. I will return to this point below to suggest that this lack of fit 
results from a structural dichotomy in his work that, unfortunately, reproduces the 
public/private dichotomy, a flaw that costs his critical credentials severely. 
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understood to be natural, the inevitable method of achieving 
economic efficiency: Of course, there may be vibrant debates as to 
the extent of directorial responsibility or workers' rights, but all of 
this takes place within the usually unchallenged assumption that the 
ultimate control of the enterprise rests with the owners. Or again, 
in relation to the private-rights complex, we tend to model all our 
conceptions of rights on the paradigm of property conceived of as 
permanent, nearly absolute, exclusive, possessive entitlements to 
divisible portions of the social capital that provide us with a zone of 
discretion into which no other may intrude. . Again, there may be 
debates as to what to include within the concept of rights, but the 
fundamental "possessivist" conception of rights remains unchallenged. 
As these examples demonstrate, the e lements of the formative 
context constrain the trajectory and potential of social interaction . 
. Moreover, there are homologies and points of intersection between 
the work-organization complex and the private-rights complex, in 
that each has a constitutive impact on the other.51 
More important still, embedded in these two elements of the 
formative context, one can find a "rigid order of division and 
hierarchy"52 that entrenches inequality, domination, and dependence. 
The task-definition/task-execution dichotomy legitimizes patron/client 
relations that are based on "ties of gratitude and fear."53 The 
private-rights complex enables property holders to reduce others to 
conditions of dependency. Clearly, then, as currently constituted, 
each of these complexes is antithetical to the "radical project" of 
empowered democracy. 
Yet, for Unger, neither . of these twin dynamics should be 
understood as total. Through a lengthy discussion of the genesis of 
the work-organization complex, the private-rights complex, and the 
governmental-organization complex, he presents an historical thesis 
that demonstrates, not only the contingent and paradoxical origins 
51 He is at pains to emphasize, however, that the relationship is not one of determinism. An example of such a viewpoint would be the economistic Marxist argument that the economic base determines the legal superstructure. See K. Marx, "Preface to a Coritribution to a Critique of Political Economy" in D. McLellan, ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) at 388. 
52 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 135. 
53 Ibid. at 137. 
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of each of these complexes, but also the peivasiveness of resilient 
and unassimilable deviations.54 For Unger, instability is as peivasive 
as stability, though it tends to be obscured by the "deceptive patina 
of naturalness and necessity."55 He develops for our consideration 
the following examples. In relation to the work-organization 
complex, he posits that, as the twentieth century56 has moved 
forward, economic success has become increasingly dependent upon 
the ability to innovate. In turn, this has required a flexibility that is 
incompatible with a rigid distinction between task-execution and 
task-definition.57 With the blurring of the distinction, patron/client 
relations, though still peivasive, have become somewhat more fluid 
and dispersed and therefore unstable. Similarly, within the private­
rights complex, there have been transgressions and deviations that 
simply do not fit within the proprietary paradigm: for example, the 
legal doctrines of unjust enrichment, inequality of bargaining power, 
and fiduciary relations in contract law. Even more importantly still, 
Unger argues that the current escalation of these instabilities and 
deviations echoes the fact that there is emerging an alternative vision 
of the nature and patterns of human association and the appropriate 
conditions of social interaction, one that rejects clientalism, 
domination, and dependence: 
The basic, minimal theme has been negative and cautionary: the claim that the dominant forms of industrial society to have emerged in the course of Western history cannot be correctly understood as required by the inherent constraints of practical organization or economic necessity. At successive points in the history of these institutional arrangements, solutions containing the elements of alternative institutional schemes were proposed or tried out. . The deviations emerged repeatedly; each step toward the consolidation of a dominant style of economic or governmental organization created new opportunities to break away from it. There is no end in sight to the rearrangements nor - if the general view of society developed in this study is correct - can there be. One of the most important reasons for this continuous recurrence of 
54 Ibid. at 180-220. 
55 Ibid. at 262. 
56 The historical deviance can be traced to petty commodity production which, as we shall see, is the prototype for Unger's reconstructed economy. 57 In fact, Unger goes on to suggest that in these developments we can locate the rudiments of a "rival ... style of economic organization," a more democratic "system of decentralized and flexible production and dissociated property" that can provide an alternative to the current hierarchal system of economic relations. Such a system draws its impetus from, but goes far beyond, petty commodity production. False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 222. 
1990] A Critical Review of Unger 's Politics 661 
alternatives is that no set of institutional practices or conceptions of social life ever 
wins a complete victory. More often than not, the deviations persist. They reach an 
accommodation with the victorious organizational arrangements, which they both 
complement and jeopardize, and assume a subsidiary or anomalous role within an order 
constituted on other principles. At any moment these anomalies of organization or 
belief may be treated as points of departure for fundamental reconstruction. Thus, the 
imagination may find in current reality the materials it needs for even its most 
subversive efforts.58 
Unger's point, then, is that the elements of the formative context 
are in fact transient, that they vary in the extent to which they 
tolerate flexibility, and that their inherent tensions can be 
exacerbated and escalated in order to further "crack them open to 
politics." Moreover, given their mutually constitutive nature, a 
modification of one element may help generate modifications of 
another. 
The reason why his discussion of formative contexts is important 
is that each of the components of the contexts comes about through 
the peculiar and particular interaction of a variety of microforces. 
Rather than being some inevitable conglomeration of social forces, 
each formative context has "a hodgepodge, pasted-together, trumped­
up quality."59 It is the combination of these micro-peculiarities that 
results in one formative context rather than another. More 
importantly still, the script is not pre-written. It is human agency 
that gives rise to the direction of each of these microforces and, 
therefore, it is human agency that contributes to the overall nature 
of a formative context. Viewed from this perspective, we can 
remember that "[w]e put more of the infinite us into the finite 
worlds in which we live."60 This is not to be taken as saying that a 
particular society is the product of simple voluntarism or individual 
intentionalism. Rather, it is simply to acknowledge that people play 
a role in history, that their contribution to a micro-societal force may 
have some impact - direct or indirect - on the larger context in 
which they find themselves. The formative context is a combination 
of a variety of humanly constructed social forces and, in that sense, 
it is incompatible with necessitarian theories that rely on an 
58 Ibid. at 221. 
59 Ibid. at 96. 
60 Ibid. at 97. 
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essentialist dichotomy of framework and routine, with the in-built 
conviction that the former determines the latter.61 This explanatory 
theory of formative contexts is significant in that it is pivotal for 
Unger's reconstructive and programmatic agenda. If a particular 
formative context is a combination of microforces that are in part 
the result of purposeful human agency, then,' depending on the 
direction of that agency, that combination could be different. An 
awareness of combination allows for the possibility of recombination. 
A formative context is not, therefore, an "indivisible package," for its 
"components do not have to stand or fall together. They can be 
replaced piecemeal. And each such partial substitution changes the 
face of routine politics."62 Recombination can come about through 
the reworking of the micro-societal forces so as to change the 
context. Human agency plays a key role in these micro-societal 
forces and this, in turn, has an impact upon the larger context. 
Thus, to return to the example of liberalism with its assumption that 
there is a necessary connection between private property and a free 
market on the one hand, and freedom and equality on the other, 
Unger argues that this is a confusing conflation that equates current 
(and therefore contingent) market and democratic structures with the 
essence of true democratic and market ordering. If we were to 
change the nature and relations of both property and the market, 
that would not necessarily eliminate freedom and equality. On the 
contrary, we might just enhance freedom and equality by avoiding 
the inequality and domination generated by current ( monopolistic or 
oligopolistic) market and political ( elitist and privileged) structures/ 
processes. Unger's thesis is that the reason why formative contexts 
change is not because of some inevitable, metahistorical law, but 
because the subcomponents of the formative context are dynamic, 
a dynamism that is generated by the purposeful activity of 
61 One interesting example is his reinterpretation of the legal origins of corporate power in the United States. Unger posits that, far from being either a necessary component in the emergence of American democracy (a liberal conseivative analysis) or an inevitable stage for American capitalism (a Marxist analysis), the emergence of incorporationism was highly contested and emerged as the result of a fusion of context-specific social microforces. Any inevitability that it might appear to have is either the product of a post facto rationalization (in the case of liberals and conseivatives) or weak economic history (in the case of Marxists). Ibid. at 176-80. 62 Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 63. 
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destabilizing human agency. Moreover, as we have seen, Unger's 
preference is for those contexts that render themselves open to self­
revision, because those are the ones that offer the greatest scope for 
human empowerment. Thus, the agenda of disentrenchment/ 
denaturalization is twofold: "the creation of formative contexts that 
both undermine stable roles and hierarchies and efface the contrast 
between context-preserving routine and context-transforming 
conflict. "63 
It is in this way that Unger challenges the fatalism inherent in 
the Twilightenment, by reclaiming the power of human agency, by 
engendering empowerment, and by reactivating a smothered politics. 
Society and social interaction are artifactual, constructed; what has 
been constructed can be deconstructed and reconstructed. Contexts, 
good or bad, are contingent; they can be smashed and remade. And 
even more importantly, this can come about through ways other than 
total revolution. Through the reworking of the subcomponents of 
the formative contexts - by taking advantage of the deviations, the 
resistances, the exceptions, and our human potential for negative 
capability - the formative contexts themselves change, thereby 
providing us with a middle path between fruitless reform and 
inconceivable revolution. The Ungerian alternative is "revolutionary 
reform"64 in the organization of government, law, the economy, and 
our personal relations. In this way, he hopes to regenerate a 
political practice that pursues the radical "commitment to weaken 
rigid divisions among roles, genders, classes, communities, and whole 
societies and to free us from the compulsions of unr�visable 
contexts."65 
2. Programmatic: institutional reconstruction 
The programmatic argument that grows out of the foregoing 
explanatory theory is underpinned and inspired by a vision of 
desirable conditions and relations of social interaction. Unger's 
63 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 253. 
64 See, e.g., Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 163. 
65 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 253. 
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reconstructive proposals for government, the market, and law are 
carefully designed to advance his conception of human 
empowerment: the "disengage[ment] of our practical and passionate 
dealings from the restrictive influence of entrenched social roles and 
hierarchies."66 More particularly, "[t]he forms of governmental and 
economic organization proposed ... emphasize the development of 
practices and institutions that prevent factions, classes, or any other 
specially placed groups from gaining control over the key resources 
of a society (wealth, power, and knowledge)."67 In Politics, Unger 
takes to heart the omnipresent liberal critique that traditionally the 
left has been prolific with critique, but barren when it comes to 
alternative suggestions. He takes as his responsibility the task of 
articulating a relatively detailed programme of institutional 
reconstruction that can facilitate the pursuit of human empowerment 
through the disentrenchment of privilege. In this way, he hopes to 
illustrate that his 1s, indeed, a credible theory of social 
transformation. 
a) Empowered democracy 
Before we go any further, let us remind ourselves what Unger 
is up to. As he is at pains to emphasize: 
The program of empowered democracy is merely the next step in a trajectory: not 
the millennium but the further emancipation of our practical and passionate 
attachments from a predetermined script, the further subversion of a fixed plan of 
social division and hierarchy, and the further reach toward the forms of individual and 
collective empowerment this context smashing may produce.68 
In this way, he hopes that we will be "freer to deal with one another 
as individuals rather than as placeholders in the system of class, 
communal, role, or gender contrasts."69 Moreover, he proposes that 
the way to achieve this is to narrow the gap between framework-
66 Ibid. at 9. 
67 Ibid. at 10. 
6B Ibid. at 361. 
69 Ibid. at 363. 
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preserving routine and framework-transforming conflict, a move that 
can be best achieved by the intensification of grass-roots 
participation in the processes and structures of both state and 
society. Thus, his ideal of "empowered democracy" encompasses 
three different levels or varieties of empowerment: the achievement 
of conscious control over the present formative context, the 
reconciliation of individual autonomy with the need to establish 
community, and the fostering of the productive capacities of society. 
Moreover, the accomplishment of each is intertwined with the 
accomplishment of the others, "the ends [are] prefigured in their 
means 1170 and cumulatively they enlarge our vision of the democratic 
ideal. Further, .Unger develops in fairly significant detail how we 
should begin to remake contemporary western liberal democratic 
institutions in pursuit of the ideal. 
Unger spends a few hundred pages sketching out his proposals 
for a renovation and recombination of the basic institutional 
structure of society. His pivotal criticism of the majority of 
contemporary institutions is that they are primarily preservative. 
They are designed to reinforce existing cultural patterns, rather than 
to change them. Such structural conservativism works to the 
advantage of the already existent citadels of private power, thereby 
helping to entrench inequality and illegitimate hierarchy. The 
remedy suggested by Unger is neither anarchy nor revolution, but 
reconstruction so that our institutions are more open, "structure­
revising" rather than "structure-preserving." Such a perspective 
reverses .the received hierarchy of stability and flexibility without 
falling into chaos. The strategy is revolutionary reform: "the view 
that formative contexts can be replaced piecemeal and the thesis 
that the deviant elements in any social order have a subversive and 
reconstructive potential. "71 
In keeping with his thesis of the artifactual nature of social 
interaction and his proposition "that it's all politics" ( and probably as 
a rebuttal of the Marxist propensity for economic reductionism and 
the lawyer's predilection for juridical self-aggrandizement), Unger 
commences his discussion of institutional reconstruction by 
7o Ibid. at 442. 
71 Ibid. at 468. 
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emphasizing "the importance of the organization of government and 
of the struggle over governmental power as the chief means for the 
stabilization or destabilization of society."72 Thus, though still of 
vital importance, both economics and law are decentered in that 
"[l]awmaking and discretionary economic policy are the chief tools 
with which the state goes to work on social life."73 
b) Constitutional reorganization - political 
Unger is very conscious of the crucial strategic power of the 
state: "[for] the control of governmental power exercises an 
overwhelming influence upon the course of conflict over the basic 
form of society."74 In particular, he spends a great deal of time 
talking about both the institutions and the political processes of 
empowered democracy. In this section, there is only space to discuss 
the former. 75 
Lest there be any confusion, Unger is no anarchist, for he 
comes not to "bypass the state" but to "rebuild it. "76 Indeed, he goes 
out of his way to repudiate 
as misguided and self-defeating, any attempt to do without large-scale governmental and economic institutions and to replace institutional arrangements with an uncontroversial system of pure, uncoercive human coordination. A premise of the program is that no such system exists and that the development of less coercive systems of coordination !s �u�d � with the transformation - not the abolition - of governmental mst1tullons. 
72 Ibid. at 442. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. at 401. 
75 For tentative, but highly suggestive, discussions of the processes, practices, and strategies of revolutionary reform and empowered democracy: see ibid. at 395-441, 539-50. 
76 Ibid. at 312. 
77 Ibid. at 432. But this is not to say that Unger sees no distinction between state and civil society. For example, as we shall see later, ·he advocates a system of rights that limits public, as well as private, power and he discusses what he calls . "antigovernmental" or "antistatist" voluntary associations that help "keep the state humble and the people proud, inquisitive, and restless." Ibid. at 480. It is interesting to note, however, that this discussion of voluntary associations makes reference to Tamara Lothian, one of the few references to a woman in his rather useful notes. Ibid. at 627. 
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For Unger, the great virtue of the state is that it ensures 
remembrance of the artifactual nature of society, because "the 
naturalization of society is the peculiar risk of statelessness."78 
Through an intriguing discussion of the contingent origins and 
historical mutations of the contemporary liberal constitutional 
structure, a thesis that is designed to demonstrate that democracy 
has no necessary inevitable form, Unger argues that traditionally our 
political structures have been bifurcated so as to differentiate 
between "fundamental" and "normal" politics. (Remember the 
framework-routine dichotomy.) This distinction is institutionalized 
through the differentiation of constitutional politics and everyday 
politics, with the former providing the parameters for the latter. 
The two realms differ in their openness to challenge and change. 
Because it is understood to be more important, the constitutional 
structure is rendered more inflexible, requiring exceptional 
procedures for transformation, thereby "placing much of the 
established institutional order effectively beyond the reach of 
democratic politics."79 Viewed in this light, the classical liberal 
constitutional technique of the separation of powers between the 
executive, legislature, and the judiciary is primarily preservative of 
the status quo because, like the forms of action, it channels the 
pursuit of remedies through rigid, discrete, and constraining 
processes. This encourages a process of institutional fobbing off, 
thereby reinforcing the already entrenched politics of privilege, 
facilitating a hardening of the "links between private privilege and 
governmental power,1180 and allowing the state to become hostage to 
an entrenched faction. Moreover, the conservative bent of the 
constitutional political set up has a trickle down effect in that it 
overdetermines the potential r·ange of possibilities available in the 
realm of normal politics. Resistance to change is therefore 
structurally ensured through "constitutional rules that discourage bold 
programmatic experiments. "81 
78 Ibid. at 505. 
79 Ibid. at 449. 
80 Ibid. at 406. 
81 Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 85 . 
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Unger argues, however, that there is no need to acquiesce in 
such "demobilizing constitutionalism,"82 that there is no a priori 
reason why our political structures must be constructed in this way. 
Rather, he argues that such a perspective incorporates a background 
assumption that prefers stability over change. If we preferred 
openness to fixity, radical democracy to the entrenchment of elitism, 
then, because of the importance of the constitution, we would 
construct it so as to incorporate a "principle of permanent self­
revision"83 to facilitate change and inspire a volatile normal politics, 
rather than the opposite. The important question then becomes: 
In whose interests do these competing assumptions about stability 
and malleability operate? Unger realizes that, at this point, it is not 
possible to turn the constitutional structure inside out in a way that 
would be attractive to him - as a "constitutionalism of permanent 
mobilization"84 - so he suggests that we attempt to liquify the 
distinction between constitutional and ordinary politics so as to make 
the former more like the latter. 
Particularly, he suggests that we "must therefore multiply the 
number of branches in governments while attributing overlapping 
functions to the agencies of the state."85 For example, he suggests 
the establishment of a new branch of government the 
destabilization branch86 - that is charged with 
enlarging access to the means of communication, information, and expertise, all the way from the heights of governmental power to the internal arrangements of the 
87 workplace .... 
Such a branch of government must be legally and financially qualified to oversee the basic arrangements separating technical coordination and managerial advice from a generic disciplinary authority in the workplace.... It must be able to make know-how available to those who, under the conditions I shall describe, set up new productive enterprises. It must be able to intervene in all other social institutions and change 
82 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 459. 
83 Ibid at 461. 
84 Ibid. at 462. 
85 Ibid at 449. 
86 This is my term not Unger's, although obviously it dovetails with the spirit of his proposal. 
87 Ibid at 450. 
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their operations, by veto or affirmative initiative. Its power to intervene must be directly related to the task of securing the conditions that would maximize information about affairs of state and achieve the maximum subordination of expert cadres to collective conflicts and deliberations. The officers of such a branch would be selected by joint suffrage of other powers in the state, the parties of opinion, and the universal electorate.88 
The purpose of such a branch would be to "rescu[ e] know-how from 
privilege,"89 to inhibit the overconcentration of knowledge - for that 
results in domination - and to facilitate its redistribution because, in 
Unger's opinion, that will enhance competition, equality, and 
efficiency. 
The immediate problem with such a proposal is that such an 
interventionist branch could become despotic, a sort of 
superexecutive, unrestrained by the other institutions or processes of 
government. Such a criticism leads to the second plank of Unger's 
proposal for constitutional renovation: the attribution of overlapping 
functions to different governmental agencies. This suggestion is an 
attempt to forge democratic accountability through a technique that 
does not succumb to the sclerotic - and structurally conservative -
effects of the system of checks and balances.90 The basic idea is to 
decentralize power in order to enable various institutions to perform 
a variety of responsibilities that are, within the current liberal 
democratic scheme of things, functionally discrete. Thus, the 
judiciary, legislature, and executive (and his other suggested novel 
institutions of government) would begin to fulfill, in part, each 
others' functions.91 The central advantage is that this would enable 
BB 
Ibid. at 450-51. 
89 Ibid at 453. 
9o Again, the technique adopted by Unger is to demonstrate the contingent historical sources of the system of checks and balances and to posit its now anachronistic nature. 
91 This may not be as heretical as one might think. Consider, for example, the various functions fulfilled by the Canadian Human Rights Commission: advocate, investigator, adjudicator, conciliator, bureaucracy, lawmaker, monitor, and educator/lobbyist. Consider two further examples: in R. v. Operation Dismamle, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 455, the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the Charter so as to give an expansive understanding of judicial jurisdiction, one that allows them to intervene even on political questions, the traditional preserve of the executive: Cabinet decisions fall under s. 32(1)(a) of the Charter and are therefore reviewable in the courts and subject to judicial scrutiny for compatibility with the Constitution. I have no doubt that the executive branch of the Canadian Government is duty bound 
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and encourage the citizenry to participate in all the institutions of 
government, to mobilize, make claims, and repudiate the bureaucratic 
denials of institutional appropriateness. Moreover, given that the 
original rationale for the system of checks and balances was for the 
protection of citizens from an overly intrusive state, this legitimate 
concern can be achieved in an alternative way: through his 
reconstructed system of rights.92 
To summarize, through a renovation of the institutions of 
government and by the means of a diversification of functions, 
Unger hopes to jumble up the currently quasi-paralytic nature of 
governmental activity to encourage extended civic participation and 
to counteract the politics of private privilege. Those ambitions 
however - if serious - also require an assault on the citadels of 
economic power. 
c) Empowered democracy and the reorganization of the economy 
True to his anti-necessitarian faith, Unger argues that the 
concept of the market is institutionally indeterminate. That is, he 
argues that the generic idea of a market has no necessary particular 
institutional manifestation, that several different variations of 
exchange relations can all qualify as a market.93 In making this 
claim, Unger seeks to make explicit and direct the connection 
between the constitution and the market to illuminate the nexus 
between politics and economics. Like the state and law, the 
economy is artifactual. 
Unger argues that within liberal democratic society there has 
been a conflation of the abstract concept of the market with an 
to act in accordance with the dictates of the Charter. At the same time, section 33 of the Charter allows for parliamentary or legislative override of certain constitutional rights, infringing what, in traditional American conceptions of the separation of powers, is the preserve of the judicial branch. 
92 See section III.B.2.(d), infra at 675ff. 
93 For example, laissez faire, corporatist, cooperative, and regulatory/distributive exchange relations can all be considered markets, but each envisions very different conceptions of the market. None more accurately captures the essence of a market because the concept of market is, to use Gallie's phrase, "essentially contested." 
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historically specific set of juridico-economic assumptions and 
institutions, what he calls the "consolidated property right." Through 
this concept, Unger attempts to get an angle on the widely held 
belief that property has one essential meaning: that the owner has 
an exclusive, "more or less absolute entitlement to a divisible portion 
of social capital - more or less absolute both in its discretionary use 
and in the chain of voluntary transfers by successive property 
owners."94 
Although Unger recognizes that the virtue of the consolidated 
property right is that it allows for decentralization and therefore the 
possibility of autonomy, he polemicizes vehemently against its 
weaknesses from the perspective of empowered democracy. When 
considered through the desideratum of freedom, the consolidated 
property right is doubly flawed. First, it allows for an unrestrained 
concentration of wealth, thereby enabling a small number of people 
to have disproportionate control over the direction of the economy. 
In a word, it is anti-democratic. Second, it is disempowering in that 
its acceptance of the task-definition/task-execution dichotomy 
tolerates and legitimizes "inequalities of wealth that reduce some 
people to effective economic dependence upon others."95 Nor, 
according to Unger, can these twin concerns be set off against 
traditional economic criteria such as progress. The consolidated 
property right is, within the scheme of Ungerian economics, 
insufficiently efficient, inadequately decentralizing, undersupportive 
of plasticity and innovation, and overly constraining upon "growth­
oriented macro-economic policy."96 Thus, though it might be deeply 
entrenched in our collective psyche, the consolidated property right 
uniquely combines privilege, domination, and waste. 
Unger denies the hegemony of this conception of property, 
positing that other variations on the idea of a property right are 
conceivable, workable, and desirable if we really do aspire to a more 
egalitarian society. Unger's favoured alternative is a "disaggregated 
property right": one that allows for conditional and limited 
94 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 481. 
95 Ibid. at 483. 
96 See section III.B.2.(d), infra at 675ff. 
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individual and group claims to portions of the social capital.97 
Traces of this proposal are already to be found in the ways in which 
governments currently interface with industry.98 This idea is worked 
out in greater detail through a discussion of what he calls the 
"rotating capital fund" which is designed to fragment 
control over capital into several tiers of capital takers and capital givers. The ultimate capital giver is a social capital fund controlled by the decisional center of the empowered democracy: the party in office and the supporting representative assemblies. The ultimate capital takers are teams of workers, technicians, and entrepreneurs, who make temporary and conditional claims upon divisible portions of this social capital fund. The central fund does not lend money out directly to the primary capital users. Instead, it allocates resources to a variety of semi-independent investment funds. Each investment fund specializes in a sector of the economy and in a type of investment. The central democratic institutions exercise their ultimate control over the forms and rates of economic accumulation and income distribution by establishing these funds or by closing them out, by assigning them new infusions of capital or by taking capital away from them, by charging them interest (whose payment represents the major source of governmental finance), and, most importantly, by setting the outer limits of variation in the terms on which the competing investment funds may allocate capital to the ultimate capital takers. The investment funds may take resources away from one another, thus forming in effect a competitive capital market, whose operations are also overseen by the central representative bodies of the democracy. The investment funds in turn allocate resources to the primary capital takers - teams of entrepreneurs, technicians, and workers - under two different regimes. The funds set the terms on which financial and technological resources may be obtained. The capital users pay an interest charge to their investment fund just as the latter pays a charge to the central social fund. Within the limits laid down by both the central governmental bodies and the competing investment funds, these direct capital takers buy and sell. Within those limits they, too, may bid resources away from one another. They profit from successful enterprise and suffer from business failure. But they never acquire permanent individual or group rights to the capital they receive. Nor does success entitle them to expand continuously, to buy out other enterprises, or to 
97 Unger would also abolish the hereditary transm1ss1on of substantial assets, as he considers inheritance anti-egalitarian and antithetical to dissociation. 
98 Consider, for example, the plethora of contributions, subsidies, grants, low interest and forgivable loans, loan guarantees, and tax incentives that governments provide to market players. Consider also Esquimalt and Nanaimo Ry Co. v. A.G. British Columbia, [1948) S.C.R. 403, [1950] A.C. 87 (Privy Council); R. v. Lethbridge Colleries, [1951) S.C.R. 138; R. v. Joy Oil 
Co., [1949) Ex. C.R. 136, affd [1951) S.C.R. 624. These cases, which are usually categorized as lack of governmental contractual intent, may be better understood as progenitors of a disaggregrated property right, one that recognizes an entitlement, but one that is temporary, not permanent. Thus, rather than having the absolutist dichotomy of contract/no contract, we can recognize a more context specific understanding of relations of interdependence. See also, 
Grant v. New Brunswick (1973), 6 N.B.R. (2d) 95 (N.B. C.A.). 
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introduce into their own business a special category of relatively disadvantaged and voiceless workers. Success merely increases their income.99 
Underlying the idea of the rotating capital fund, then, there are two 
seemingly paradoxical ambitions: a more socially responsible 
economy that is open to democratic review and control and, at the 
same time, a more flexible and innovative economy because of its 
structurally ensured decentralization. 
This triple layered structuring of the market to decentralize the 
relations between capital-givers and capital-takers, while at the same 
time encouraging democratic control and entrepreneurial innovation, 
can be schematized on the chart on the following page.100 The idea 
behind such a capital-allocation system is to help increase the 
flexibility and productivity of the market, to convert the economy 
into a "perpetual innovation machine,"101 while at the same time 
decentralizing and fragmenting economic power with its ever present 
potential for exploitation and domination. This Unger calls a 
modernized and "reconstructed version of petty commodity 
production. "102 
A reconstruction of the economy on the basis of the 
disaggregation of the consolidated property right and the rotating 
capital fund provides a unique opportunity for greater openness and 
99 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 491-92. 
JOO Of course, there are concerns about the extent of state power if it has access to such direct control of the economy. Unger spends a great deal of time outlining new forms of participation and accountability that are designed to counterbalance such power. Economics and politics are carefully woven together in the Ungerian scheme, whereas modern liberalism attempts to deal with their relationship through denying its existence. 
lOl False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 491. 
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opportunity1°3 that does not call for anarchy, or even inefficiency, 
but the decentering of the economics of privilege. However, a 
democratized economy and an egalitarian mode of exchange 
relations can only be achieved if there is also ongoing reworking of 
the constitutional structure and a remaking of the system of rights. 
d) Rights 
Greater specificity can be given to these ideas of constitutional 
reconstruction and economic reorganization through an overview of 
" Unger's system of rights. Unlike many critics of liberalism, Unger 
does not advocate the abandonment of rights discourse. Rather, he 
advocates a redefinition and expansion of rights to facilitate 
individual and group empowerment and to enhance security and 
participation, while decentering the privileges of property. 
Note, however, that Unger's approach to rights is a far cry 
from the abstract deontologicalism of much of contemporary 
liberalism. Rather, Unger's conception of rights is much more 
context specific. It is a carefully tailored schematization that is 
designed to facilitate the demands of empowered democracy. 
Perhaps the best way to understand his theory of rights is to 
recognize the homology with his critique and reformation of the 
economy. Remember that, for Unger, the core problem with the 
current economy is the constraining influence of the consolidated 
property right. The consolidated property right is not simply an 
economic presupposition, although it is that too and therefore vitally 
important. It is also a foundational legal principle. Indeed, it is 
because of its centrality to the legal regime that it is so important 
to the market. Restated, the consolidated property right is 
constitutive of both contemporary law and the modern economy. 
Therefore, it has to go. 
103 This opportunity ripples beyond the extended availability of capital towards the transformation of the conditions of labour. To a significant extent, Unger expects disaggregation and decentralization to generate a softening of the distinction between task­definition and task-execution that encourages the corralling of all entrepreneurial resources, regardless of the traditional hierarchies of employer and employee. 
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The problem with the consolidated property right from the 
legal point of view is that it has attained imaginative and practical 
hegemony both in form and substance. Earlier, we identified its 
substantive components - property as exclusive, permanent, nearly 
absolute control - and its democratic and economic weaknesses. 
Much of modern law is simply a concretization and routinization of 
the consolidated property right and its limitations. But the 
consolidated property right works its nefarious influence on law in 
a second, perhaps more important, way: through its form. Because 
of its position of ideological dominance, it has become "a model for 
rights dealing with matters far removed from the methods for 
economic decentralization."104 The consolidated property right has 
become the prototype for conceptualizing rights. All thinking about 
rights is moulded to "force large areas of existing social practice into 
incongruous legal forms."105 Unger's thesis is that by mimicking this 
possessive proprietary paradigm, we have suffered a drastic myopia 
in developing our imaginative legal structures. 
In order to smash through the substantive and formal hegemony 
of the consolidated property right, the Ungerian constitution would 
provide for four categories of rights, thereby disaggregating property, 
enlarging democracy, and capturing more subtly the complex and 
diverse modes of social interaction. 
i) Market 
Market rights are designed to facilitate economic exchange and 
would have two facets. First, they would provide capital-takers with 
"conditional and provisional" entitlements to the economically crucial 
rotating capital fund. Second, they would regulate the relations of 
exchange between economic enterprises to ensure entrepreneurial 
initiative. In a sense, this would be similar to the function fulfilled 
by contemporary property and contract law, absent, of course, the 
influence of the consolidated property right. As a result, the 
Ungerian manifesto does not call for the abolition of property or 
l04 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 512. 
105 Ibid. 
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contract, but me�ely their transmutation. Property, as we already 
know, would be disaggregated, while contract would pursue with 
greater alacrity its current subtext of relative fairness. 
This last point should be elaborated upon. Frequently, lawyers 
assume that exchange relations are driven by an adversarial, mutually 
exploitative dynamic. However, as over two decades of socio-legal 
research have indicated, there is extensive collaboration and 
interdependence between business enterprises.106 Economic 
efficiency recognizes the value of relationalism, co-operation, and 
give and take. Unger simply wants law and the legal framework to 
do the same. (I will return to this point in the discussion of 
deviationist legal doctrine.)107 
ii) Immunity 
Immunity rights are designed to ensure security of the individual 
while enabling the citizen to participate actively and equally in the 
polity, free from the oppression of both public and private power. 
Not only would they incorporate traditional liberal democratic rights 
- freedom of expression and association, freedom from arbitrary 
arrest - they would also ensure welfare rights108 to free the citizen 
106 S. Macauley, "Non Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study" (1963) 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55; and "Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures and the Complexities of Contract" (1977) 11 Law & Soc. Rev. 537; H. Beale and T. Dugdale, "Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies" (1975) 2 Brit. J.L. & Soc. 45 . 
107 See section III.B.2.(e), infra at 681ff. There is an important point to be made here. Although Unger develops four categories of rights, these should not be understood as mutually exclusive. As will become clear, aspects of market rights are closely connected with solidarity rights, while welfare rights, though classified as a part of his immunity rights, are essential for the adoption of destabilization rights. In this sense, the Ungerian system of rights is interstructured. JOB They are defined as "guarantees of access to the material and cultural resources needed to make a life. These include provision for nourishment, housing, health care, and education, with absolute standards proportional to the wealth of society." False Necessity, 
supra, note 3 at 528. Welfare rights are a cognate of equality of condition in that they aspire to a "major equalization in the material circumstances of life." Ibid. at 47 and see also ibid. at 588. But there are limits on how far Unger wants to go. In his reconstructed economy, capital-takers will still gain or lose financially depending on the success or failure of their market activities. The rationale for differentiation appears in his belief that profit is a significant, though not necessarily essential, factor for worker motivation. The safeguard is 
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from economic oppression that not infrequently makes effective 
participation impossible.109 Thus, immunity rights are not to be 
understood as merely negative freedoms - state keep out - rather 
they are positive freedoms designed to mobilize the populace to 
participate, secure in the knowledge that any retribution (public or 
private) for democratic involvement110 cannot result in subjugation. 
Immunity is a cognate of participation. Moreover, according to 
Unger , although immunity rights incorporate traditional liberal 
democratic rights, these will take on a new empowered meaning 
given that the broader context - economic and political - in which 
they operate is in the throes of revolutionary reform. 
iii) Destabilization 
Destabilization rights are designed to ensure continued openness 
and to guard against closure with its correlative dangers of the 
entrenchment of privilege and the institutionalization of oppression. 
Destabilization rights enable the citizen to criticize and disturb all 
institutions and practices , public and private, and contemplate 
institutional support for such transgressive activity. Thus, for 
example,  if an economic enterprise was able to generate enough 
economic and political power to achieve "agency capture" of the 
intermediate investment funds and thereby to rework to its 
advantage market relations, those who would be reduced to 
dependence by such developments could call on other branches of 
that failure will not result in impoverishment. Note also that welfare rights do not include job tenure, as that would impose too great a limitation upon the requirement of economic flexibility. However, he suggests that the reason why workers want job tenure is because at the present time we have an underdeveloped system of welfare rights, a concern that will no longer apply in an Ungerian society. 
I09 A prime example is women. See, e.g., B. Nelson, "Women's Poverty and Women's Citizenship: Some Political Consequences of Economic Marginality" (1984) 10 Signs 209 (hereinafter Women's Poverty]. The claim is not that women are apolitical, rather it is that they do not participate as actively in malestream politics, in part, because of their economic subordination. They do, however, participate in many other forms of politics. llO Should anyone be so naive as to believe that the power elite of Canadian society, for example, would never be so crass as to use their economic power to coerce the workforce into political line, consider the disciplinary role adopted by employers during the free trade election, 1988. See N. Fillmore, ''The Big Oink" (1989) 22:8 171is Magazine 13. 
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government, including, but not limited to, the destabilization branch, 
to disrupt and derange such developments. And this would be a 
constitutional right. 
Though curious, destabilization rights already have inchoate 
precedents in contemporary law, for "the opportunity to destabilize 
and to reconstruct is always built into the very devices that 
perpetuate the existing social peace."111 Consider, for example, the 
injunctive relief granted by the judiciary in relation to the practices 
of hospitals, asylums, and schools, institutions which traditionally 
have tended to be exempt from the desiderata of equality or 
democracy. Or again, consider judicial intervention in the electoral 
process in an attempt to secure greater equality.112 Even more 
poignant are the activities of the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission and decisions of the courts promoting the remedies of 
. employment equity.113 But note also that the judiciary are not 
identified as the necessary guardians of destabilization. Given 
Unger's earlier proposal for overlapping functions and his advocacy 
in favour of a new destabilization branch, we cannot take refuge in 
the old shibboleths or trust an ancient and privileged bureaucracy. 
iv) Solidarity 
Finally, solidarity rights recognize our vulnerability as social 
beings and attempt to "give legal form to social relations of reliance 
and trust."114 In particular, they are a response to the more 
communal elements of our activities: 
The domain of solidarity rights is the field of the half-articulate relations of trusting interdependence that absorb so much of ordinary social life but remain troublesome abberations for a legal theory devoted to the model of consolidated property. The situations calling for the exercise of such entitlements include family life, continuing business relationships (as distinguished from one-shot transactions), and the varied range of circumstances falling under fiduciary principles in contemporary law. The 
Ill False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 546. 
112 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Dixon v. A.G. British Columbia (1989), 35 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273. 
113 Action Travail des Femmes v. C.N.R, [1987) 1 S.C.R. 1114. 
114 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 535. 
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trust such relations require may be voluntary and reciprocal or half-deliberate and unequal, usually in the setting of disparities of power or advantage.115 
Unger is cautious not to be misunderstood in his espousal of 
solidarity rights. Although they are anti-individualistic in that they 
impose an obligation to "take other people's situations and 
expectations into account,"116 they are not designed to enforce a 
"despotism of virtue" where everybody is a "goody goody." That 
would be too substantive for Unger. Rather: 
[t)he immediate aim, instead, is to accomplish just the reverse of what consolidated property offers the rightholder. People bound by solidarity rights are prevented from taking refuge in an area of absolute discretion within which they can remain deaf to the claims others make upon them. Thus, solidarity rights deny the discretionary action both immunity rights and market rights seek to protect.117 
Finally, solidarity rights differ from the traditional conception of 
rights in that, rather than being abstract, they emerge from context 
specific situations of reliance and interdependence. 
This is a particularly interesting proposal in that traditionally 
working on an assumed public/private dichotomy, most legal thought 
considers law to be too blunt an instrument for the regulation of 
intimate and communal relations. Not so for Unger. He recognizes 
that "it's all politics," and where there is politics there is power, and 
where there is power there is a possibility of domination and 
subordination. For example, at one point he describes the family as 
"a structure of power, ennobled by sentiment,"118 and suggests that 
legal abstentionism from the family realm can result in complicity in 
domination. He refuses to accept such an idyllic conception of 
community or acquiesce in such a restrictive understanding of rights. 
Yet, at the same time, he wants to expand our conception of rights 
so that we are not simply publicizing the private realm. Even 
though solidarity rights are rights, they need not attain their quality 
of being a right on the premise of positivism, that is, that they are 
coercively enforced by the state. That particular presupposition is 
115 Ibid. at 536-37. 
116 Ibid. at 537. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Critical Legal Studies, supra, note 6 at 65-66. 
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one that is tied to a conception of rights that is formally 
underpinned by the consolidated property right. Rights for Unger 
are a "public declaration of a public vision ... of possible and 
desirable human association.11119 Consequently, solidarity rights may 
be coercively enforced, but many "may best be enforced ... by more 
informal means of mediation, with more ample participation from 
parties, families, communities or work teams."120 But they are rights 
nonetheless. 
e) Deviationist legal doctrine121 
Unger also. opens up everyday legal practice and discourse to 
reconstruction. He claims that the formalist aspiration to distinguish 
law from politics is fallacious and that legal disputes always invoke 
competing background assumptions about alternative schemes of 
human co-existence. Thus, for example, he interprets contract 
doctrine to be structured around principles and counterprinciples 
which co-exist in tension. The ascendent principles relate to the 
classical model of freedom of and freedom to contract, a perspective 
that is premised on a more individualistic conception of social 
relations. He argues that the principles have never attained 
complete hegemony and have been modified by counterprinciples 
that emphasize interdependence and reliance, a perspective that is 
premised on a more communitarian conception of social interaction. 
He posits that neither can attain such extensive pre-eminence so as 
to �xclude completely the influence of the other, but that different 
balances reflect broader political understandings of the good society. 
Thus, he argues that it is the responsibility of progressive lawyers to 
practice what he calls "deviationist doctrine": to expand from within, 
to use the tools and doctrine already available to make the law 
reflect a more interdependent vision of social interaction. For 
119 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 539. 
120 Ibid. at 538-39. 
121 The previous paragraph and this section draw on Critical Legal Studies, supra, note 6, rather than Politics, but, for the sake of comprehensiveness, it is useful to include his proposals. 
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example, he would see the growth of estoppel and the recent 
recommendations of the Ontario Law Reform Commission to expand 
the scope of unconscionability, good faith, and fairness in contractual 
relations122 as steps in the right direction, although requiring much 
greater effort and commitment. 
f) Plasticity and Passion 
If we step back from these more detailed proposals for politics, 
economics, and law, we can see that the "key strategy" of 
empowered democracy "is to combine freedom of enterprise and 
governance at the local level with the opportunity for political 
parties in central government to promote decisive social experiments, 
particularly experiments that change institutions as well as 
policies."123 Restated, empowered democracy is about the 
maximization of plasticity124 and a belief that "law and the 
constitution [should be] the denial rather than the reaffirII1:ation of 
the plan of social division and hierarchy."125 
Clearly, then, the Ungerian political agenda is ambitious in that 
it expects re-visioning of the world, a reconceptualization of politics, 
and a remaking of the basic structure of society. This is a lot to 
expect from a community that has become mired in the modernist 
malaise, succumbed to the "consumerist rapture of a privatistic 
hedonism."126 Yet true to form and driven by his conviction that 
"it's all politics," Unger refuses to believe that this is our destiny. 
Thus, in the penultimate section of False Necessity, he posits a 
"cultural-revolutionary counterpart to the institutional program," by 
which he means an Ungerian theory of human nature. The claim is 
relatively straightforward: there are homologies between our 
122 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Amendment of the Law of Contract (Toronto: The Commission, 1987). 
123 Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 87. 
124 I will return to the theme of plasticity in the oveiview of the final volume of Politics. 
125 RM. Unger, ''The Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1983) Haiv. L. Rev. 561 at 585. 
126 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 545. 
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"practical" and "passionate" lives and for either to be viable they 
must be mutually complementary. Thus, paralleling his modernist 
theory of society - the theory that identifies its contextual and 
artifactual nature - there is a modernist theory of human nature: 
one that argues that we have no fixed, immutable characteristics, 
that we are "the infinite caught within the finite." The connection 
is crucial, for "the qualities of our direct practical or passionate 
dealings always represent the ultimate object of our conflicts over 
the organization of society."127 
Most of the ideas for this "personalized program" were 
developed in a previous work Passion.128 The basic idea is a revised 
"ideal of community," but one that does not indulge in the fantasy 
of unmitigated harmony: 
The kernel of this revised ideal of community is the notion of a zone of heightened mutual vulnerability, within which people gain a chance to resolve more fully the conflict between the enabling conditions of self-assertion: between their need for attachment and for participation in group life and their fear of the subjugation and depersonalization with which such engagement may threaten them.... This notion of community shifts the gravitational center of the communal ideal away from the sharing of values and opinions and the exclusion of conflict. Here is a version of community that, although jeopardized by conflict, also thrives on it.129 
In a sense, this conception of community allows Unger to come full 
circle. Through conflict as vulnerability, we, as empowered 
citizens,130 can begin to defy, transvalue, and jumble up socially 
ascribed roles - class and gender are two that he mentions.131 They 
are roles that tend to swallow the person; roles that play a crucial 
function in perpetuating and reinforcing the realities of social 
127 Ibid. at 556. 
128 Although he also promises us a successor volume that "will explore the implications of the anti-necessitarian thesis for an understanding of the microstructure of social life: the realm of direct practical and passionate relations." Ibid. at 560. 
129 Ibid. at 562. 
l30 Unger also wanders into the realm of psychology. At one point, almost mirroring Adorno's characterization of the authoritarian personality, Unger identifies three tendencies of the "empowered personality": the accentuation of desire in both scope and intensity; the enlargement of the imagination; and the broadening of the opportunities so as to realize the former two tendencies. Ibid. at 579-80. 
l3l Ibid. at 564. 
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division and hierarchy; pre-ordained roles that, in large part, are 
responsible for our disempowerment and dependency. 
To reduce Unger's scheme to its most basic: anti-necessitarian 
social theory, plus institutional reconstruction, plus cultural 
revolution equals the possibility of empowerment. 
C. Plasticity into Power: Comparative-Historical Studies on the 
Institutional Conditions of Economic and Military Success 
This final volume is an in-depth, historical inquiry designed to 
demonstrate the explanatory superiority of the theory of formative 
contexts over its positivistic and necessitarian rivals. Through an 
erudite and thought-provoking discussion of a variety of historical 
examples, Unger documents how those societies which have been 
"successful" share a common heritage of institutional flexibility, that 
is, the ability to adapt quickly132 to other rapidly mutating forces 
within their formative context. The further suggestion is that, 
insofar as they illustrate a social theory . that "enlarges our sense of 
the real and the possible,"133 they provide role models that we 
should be loathe to ignore. Two substantive themes unite this 
volume: the first is that "social plasticity brings wealth and power to 
the societies and groups that achieve it,"134 and the second is that 
"the subjection of factional privilege to challenge and conflict has 
been the single most important spur to social plasticity."135 The 
Ungerian message of success is twofold: "the gospel of plasticity"136 
and mastery of the art of "institutional dissociation and 
recombination."137 Each of the three essays in this relatively short 
132 As he pithily posits, "Worldly success requires self-transformation." Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 101. 
133 Ibid. at 1. 
134 Ibid. al 1-2. 
135 Ibid. at 2. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. at 209. 
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volume revolves around a theme: productivity, power, and plasticity, 
which for convenience we might call the three "P's." 
The first essay is an intellectually impressive macro-historical 
review of the cycles of commercial vibrancy and languor that 
characterized pre-industrial societies. Its particular focus is to 
unpack "the social · conditions and the institutional inventions that 
enabled some societies to escape these cycles and, as a result, to 
revolutionize the world."138 Unger takes as his star examples late 
medieval Europe and seventeenth and eighteenth century Japan and, 
through an analysis of their differences, demonstrates the importance 
of contextual political conflict to the achievement of economic 
breakthrough. 
The second - essay is an historical analysis into the relationship 
between wealth and military force. Specifically, it is an attempt to 
identify the contingent political events that generate and the 
innovative (indeed adventitious) social, political, fiscal, and 
technological conditions which satisfy the successful military 
protection and consolidation of wealth. 
The third essay unites some of the themes of the first two. It 
attempts to identify the enabling social and political conditions of 
military success which, apparently within the Ungerian scheme of 
things, are founda.tional for the well-being of a society. The key is 
"the thesis of reconstructability": the societal talent for self­
transformation and the relentless re-orderings, "dissociations and 
recombinations of institutional arrangements,"139 even :-- 01; more 
accurately, especially - if that comes at the expense of the 
subversion of the traditional social roles, hierarchies, and divisions.140 
As the man says, "Anything for success. "141 
138 Ibid at 3. 
139 Ibid at 206. 
l40 Unger does point out that such a dynamic has not resulted in "egalitarianism or democracy in the state and the economy," although his suggestion is that, in so far as it is subversive, it is of precedential value. Ibid. at 187. 
141 Ibid at 189. 
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The common denominator, indeed, "the condition,"142 for both 
productive (wealth) and destructive (military) success is plasticity, 
that is, 
the facility with which work relations among people - in a plant, in a bureau, in an army - can be constantly shifted in order to suit changing circumstances, resources, and intentions. Plasticity is the opportunity to innovate in the immediate organizational settings of production, exchange, administration, or warfare and to do so not just by occasional, la'Je-scale reforms but by an ongoing, cumulative flow of small-scale innovations.14 
Moreover, according to Unger, this discovery of the explanatory 
centrality of plasticity and the historical vitality of "pitiless 
recombination"144 has only become possible because of the insights 
of an anti-necessitarian social theory. Furthermore, plasticity 
dovetails with the determinative agenda of anti-necessitarianism: the 
therapeutic knowledge that humankind does make its own history, 
that we are not the puppets of a pre-ordained script. 
Given the historical and comparative nature of Plasticity, one 
might be tempted to pass over it in a review targeted for lawyers. 
However, that would be a mistake, for, as will become evident, its 
very specificity provides us with a critical angle through which to 
unpack some of the weaknesses in the overall agenda. 
What, then, are we to make of this Ungerian "super theory"? 
Already it has spawned a progeny of responses, particularly from 
representatives of those whom he critiques - liberals, conservatives, 
Marxists, social democrats, and civic republicans.145 Some of this 
commentary has been cautiously positive, while others have been 
viciously hostile. In the following sections, I attempt to develop a 
critical response to Unger's work, one that is cognizant of the 
breadth and depth of his efforts, but one that is filtered through the 
critical prism of feminist analysis. 
142 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 592. 
143 Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 153. 
144 Ibid. at 208. 
145 The most useful source is "Symposium on Unger's Politics" (1987), 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 589-951. See also, P. Anderson, "Roberto Unger and the Politics of Empowerment" (1989) 102 New Left Review 93; S. Holmes, 'The Professor of Smashing" New Republic (19 October 1987); and A Fraser "Reconstituting Enlightened Despotism" Telos (forthcoming). 
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IV. POINTS OF INTERSECTION BETWEEN UNGER AND 
FEMINISM 
A The Personal, the Political and the Hierarchical 
As critics of contemporary society, Unger and many feminists 
share a great deal in common, politically, philosophically, and 
methodologically. First and foremost, they agree that there is no 
aspect of human interaction that can be devoid of political 
significance or impact. Feminism's proposition that "the personal is 
the political" and Unger's maxim that "it is all politics" are both 
direct challenges to legal liberalism's effort to distinguish between 
the public and the private, a strategy designed to depoliticize aspects 
of social interaction by means of a definitional fiat. Both recognize 
that within the public/private dichotomy there is embedded a series 
of power-laden assumptions that reflect and enforce a partisan - i.e., 
non-natural, contingent, and partial - vision of the appropriate 
nature of the conditions of social interaction. 
An interconnected idea common to both feminists and Unger 
is a belief that the pervasive stereotypes and roles which structure 
our mutual interaction are hierarchical and are therefore conducive 
to the continuance of domination and subordination. In so far as 
these socially constructed and ascribed roles S';Vallow the person, they 
deny our individual potentials, legitimate the status quo, and forestall 
substantive equality. The whole point of Unger's empowered 
democracy is to allow .us to break free from stereotypical structural 
constraints. A central aspiration of feminism is to create a society 
in which one's gender is not a liability. 
Apart from these critical political intersections, which I shall 
return to below, there are also several methodological 
correspondences that suggest a moment of progressive nexus 
between Unger and feminism.146 
146 The following paragraphs draw upon and are structured by Jill McCalla Vickers' excellent article "Memoirs of an Ontological Exile: The Methodological Rebellions of Feminist Research" in A Miles & G. Finn, eds, Feminism in Canada: From Pressure to Politics (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1982) 27 [hereinafter Feminism in Canada]. Again, to 
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B. Contextualism 
Perhaps the most important methodological insight of feminism 
is its critique of the "malestream," positivistic predilection for 
decontextualization and abstraction: the imperative to approach 
understanding through the tunnels of male identified rational 
analysis, with its pretensions to objectivity and neutrality. The 
positive dynamic engendered by such a critique is 
recontextualization: the preference to think and understand in situ, 
the ambition to comprehend the world experientially, from the 
bottom up. 
While recontextualizing is extremely important, particularly 
insofar as it attempts to br�ak down the subject/object dichotomy 
and identifies common experiences across diverse planes, the feminist 
awareness of the significance of contexts at times seems only to go 
so far as advancing a preference for the specific over the abstract. 
Despite its virtues, this approach may not develop the potential of 
contextualism far enough. The feminist approach to contextualism 
runs the risk of simply identifying the plethora of incompatible, 
individualized subjectivities, a particularism that may be no more 
than the inversion of abstraction and therefore allowing abstraction 
to remain the bench-mark. Even more problematic still, 
contextualism may turn out to be a potential prop for relativism and 
skepticism, perspectives which, as I have posited, contribute to 
disempowerment. 
Like feminists, Unger is methodologically post-positivist. 
Unger's theory of formative contexts may be of useful analytical and 
transformative value for feminism. Although, regrettably, Unger fails 
to do so,147 it may be possible to understand patriarchy as a central 
component of our contemporary formative context, both 
imaginatively and institutionally.148 Such a move serves a dual 
emphasize the point, of course not all feminists are in consensus about each of McCalla Vickers' propositions, but, as far as my understanding goes, her reflections capture some of the key themes of feminist epistemology. 
147 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 441. 
148 It seems to me that patriarchy clearly fits Unger's two criteria of membership in a formative context: the subjective and the objective standards. Ibid. at 61-66. 
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purpose: first, it helps identify the pervasiveness of androcentricity, 
and secondly, and I think more importantly, it suggests its 
contingency. To elaborate, Unger's theory of formative contexts, 
with its insistence on the non-monolithic and transient character of 
any society, allows feminists to posit the possibility of the 
transcendence of patriarchy. Restated, patriarchy is neither 
permanent nor necessary. It is simply a social artifact, although an 
especially pervasive, tenacious, and resilient one. Such an 
understanding helps feminism to avoid over-emphasizing the 
repressive hegemony of phallocentrism149 and thus reinforces 
feminism's pursuit of empowerment. Jn particular, it encourages 
reflections upon and the expansion of the deviances from and 
exceptions to androcentric norms and values in order to derange and 
destabilize patriarchy's repressive normalcy. Moreover, the Ungerian 
analysis of reconstructive praxis suggests that the everyday run -of the 
mill tensions between men and women encapsulate - and could be 
escalated into - larger scale disturbances of anti-egalitarian relations. 
Childcare and housework are the two obvious examples. Anti­
necessitarian social theory in the support of feminism helps to 
reinspire the politics of hope.150 
C. Restoration of Agency 
The Ungerian emphasis on the emancipatory power of his 
theory of formative contexts dovetails, to some extent, with the 
feminist emphasis on the centrality of human agency. Feminists 
argue that traditional malestream understandings of the world - for 
example, functionalism, structuralism, and Marxism - have developed 
a "context-stripping" analytical discourse that abolishes agency. The 
problem with such a discourse is that it locates social explanations 
149 In particular, I am thinking about the generally pessimistic tone of Catharine MacKinnon's Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Hazvard University Press, 1987) [hereinafter Feminism Unmodified]. See also her claim that patriarchy is "metaphysically nearly perfect" in "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence" (1983) 8 Signs 635 at 638. It seems to me that "nearly perfect" is to feminism what "relative autonomy" is to neo-Marxism, tantalizingly suggestive but explanatorily and empoweringly deficient. The difficult questions remain: How relative and how nearly? 
lSO See, generally, my Nomos and Thanatos (Part B), supra, note 2. 
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in abstractions, with the correlative underemphasis on the 
significance of human responsibility for such activity, whether it is 
praiseworthy or culpable: 
Human action is sterilized and pasteurized into a parade of forces, factors, roles, structures, institutions, stereotypes, rights, constraints, customs, attitudes, and influences - to name but a few.... It is clear that categorizing something as a custom, rite or whatever explains little of its origins, purposes or whose interests it serves. In. fact, it appears to explain away just those things we need to understand.151 
Unger's modernist inspired argument that both society and people 
are artifactual and his proposition that "it is all politics" also 
highlight the importance of human agency. Whereas feminists have 
appropriately used the insight to highlight male responsibility for 
the inequality and subordination of women, Unger puts this 
awareness to an even more affirmative use: what has been made 
can be unmade and that we could make ourselves and our societies 
more open, more egalitarian, less oppressive.152 
D. Rebellion against Linea,ity, Inevitability, and Laws 
A third theme grows out of the former two themes.153 
Feminists have been particularly concerned about the patriarchal, 
positivistic preoccupation with linearity, coherence, predictability, and 
regularity. Feminists suggest that such a perspective incorporates a 
preference for stability, closure, and certainty. The problem is that 
such desiderata tend to take on an authoritarian dynamic in that 
they begin t'o insist on naturalness, universality, and inevitability, not 
only as the criteria of epistemological validity, but also as the 
foundations of a viable social structure. None of this sits well with 
feminists who have been on the receiving end of such pretensions 
to naturalism (for example, in relation to child-bearing) and whose 
151 Feminism in Canada, supra, note 146 at 39. 
152 I will suggest later, however, that Unger does fall back into the trap of decontextualization in that he fetishizes the concept of plasticity. 
153 McCalla Vickers also identifies another theme of feminism, which she describes as "reversal," a concept that is a more generalized version of the strategy of "blaming the victim." 
Feminism in Canada, supra, note 146 al 29. I see no such parallel theme in Unger. 
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central aspiration has been to challenge normalcy, to make their 
lives different and less nonnal than they tend to be. 
Again, there are important parallels with Unger. Unger's most 
developed idea in Politics is anti-necessitarianism: the espousal of 
contingency, transience, and malleability and the rejection of 
constraining, pseudo-naturalistic inevitabilities. He, too, recognizes 
the nexus between essentialism and the dominant power order. 
Both feminism and Unger see humanity as a "self-making species" 
and · they reject any attempt to limit this potential for self and 
societal transformation as an insidious, preservative strategy that 
constructs knowledge as a repressive politics. 
E. The Rebellion Against Objectivity 
The final point of intersection between the feminist and 
Ungerian methodological critiques is their rejection of objectivity. 
Both approaches recognize that because of the centrality of 
contextualism, agency, and openness, it is impossible to cling to the 
liberal or positivistic aspiration to neutrality. They insist that the 
"view from nowhere" is either impossible or fraudulent and that 
difficult political preferences are pervasive and appropriate.154 
There is no archimedean point, it is all up for grabs. 
If these tentative suggestions as to the political, epistemological, 
and methodological correlations between Unger and feminism are 
accurate, then it suggests that there may be some common ground 
to lay the foundation for a conversation between critical theory a la 
Unger and feminism. If a conversation is possible, if there exists a 
common - or at least a translatable - interpretative framework, then 
there may be scope for mutual support as well as mutual critique. 
Even more optimistically, perhaps such a debate can assist us in our 
attempt to transcend the modernist malaise, our aspiration to 
uncouple freedom and domination. 
154 McCalla Vickers also points out that feminists understand objectivity in a second sense, as related to objectification. Ibid. at 40. I will suggest later that Unger's concept of plasticity also commits this error. 
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V. UNGERIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO FEMINISM 
I have already indicated one way in which Unger's analysis may 
be of utility to feminism, that is, the suggestion that patriarchy be 
understood as a central component of our current formative context. 
In this section, I want to consider other ways in which U nger's 
"critical social theory, reinforced by political vision and enriched by 
detailed institutional proposals and experiments,"155 may be of use 
to contemporary feminist theory and practice. 
A. Contours of the Feminist Political Agenda 
As a radical social movement, feminism is in many ways still in 
embryonic form. Its major emphases and successes have, in the 
main, been in the realm of critique, rather than reconstruction. 
Feminists have effectively highlighted the unjustifiable exclusion and 
inferiorization of women from and in every cultural sphere, including 
law. However, largely due to the hegemony of patriarchy, it has 
been difficult for feminism to articulate what the substantive 
difference of a feminist future might be. Consequently, the 
predominant tendency within feminism, at least until recently, has 
been a demand for access, the aspiration for equal opportunity. 
Although vital, this essentially liberal feminist stance is mired by 
downside risks, most significantly, the danger that feminism will 
become just another constituency in liberal pluralism's interest group 
lottery. The unfortunate result is that not a lot is done to 
adumbrate what a feminized society, state, or economy might look 
like. 
In so far as there have been serious efforts to give some 
indication as to the future direction of feminism, there has been 
little agreement amongst feminists. In particular, feminist discourse 
has centred around what can be characterized as "equalitarianism" 
155 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 377. 
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and "difference."156 However, in part because the stakes are so high, 
this debate has been difficult, resulting in confrontations that have 
on occasion been acrimonious and potentially divisive. On a 
politico-methodological level, Unger may be able to provide an 
opportunity for feminists to avoid an either/or choice that would _ 
necessitate abandoning either equality or difference, thereby enabling 
feminists to legitimately, coherently, and politically wisely to hold on 
to both ends of the chain. 
Unger posits that every radical social movement must develop 
the fertile terrain between reform and revolution. He proposes that 
such movements, if they are to have any chance of success, must 
develop a dynamic fusion of internal development and visionary 
imagination.157 Put differently, there must be a capacity to work 
from within, to deviate, to expand, and to remake the familiar and 
normal into the novel and transcendent, while being simultaneously 
informed, guided, and inspired by a transformative vision. This 
symbiosis allows a progressive movement to eclipse the false 
dichotomy of fruitless reform and utopian somnambulance. 
It seems to me that these two levels of transgressive strategy 
currently co-exist within the feminist movement. On the one side, 
there exists the potential to internally develop and expand the 
liberal commitment to equality, to remake equality into a substantive 
reality.158 On the other side, there is the transformative vision of 
difference and gynocentrism,159 a potential value structure that 
156 This point about discourse is important. McCalla Vickers introduces her discussion of agency through a reference to Mary Daly and the importance of "the power of naming," the idea that those who control the world, also control the language. The consequence is that those who want to challenge entrenched power must also challenge the dominant discourse and this requires the development of an alternative discourse - both in form and substance. See generally M. Daly, Websters' First New Intergalactic Wickedary of the English Language (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). This relates back to my previous suggestions on the language adopted by Unger, supra, note 8. 
157 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 355-62. 
158 R. Abella, Equality In Employment: A Royal Commission Report: General Summary (Toronto: Commission on Equality in Employment, 1984). 
159 See, generally, T. Moi, ed., French Feminist Thought (New York: Blackwell, 1987); C. Duchen, Feminism in France: From May '68 to Mitterand (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986) [hereinafter Feminism in France]; E. Marks & I. de Courtivron, eds, New French 
Feminisms: An Anthology (New York: Schocken Books, 1981); I. M. Young, "Humanism, 
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challenges the hegemony of masculinist liberalism in the realm of 
socio-political institutions, in the dynamics of social interaction,160 
and even in our conceptions of human identity.161 
Unger's proposal allows feminism to maintain both perspectives, 
practices, and visions. Thus, when interpreted through the prism of 
internal and visionary thought, equalitarianism and difference need 
not be understood as antithetical. To the contrary, they can be 
reconceptualized as radically and indispensably reinforcing, as 
interconnected points on a transgressive continuum.162 
B. Self and Community ... Solidarity and Care 
Unger may also be able to make a significant contribution to 
feminist reflections on the nature of the relationship between the 
self and her community. In recent years, this debate has been 
revived by the communitarian critique of liberalism.163 In essence, 
the communitarians argue that the liberal preference for individual 
liberty has gone too far, that it is premised upon a conception of 
the self that is excessively atomistic, and that it ignores aspects of 
the self that are constitutively interdependent upon others. The 
political consequences of such a radically individualistic, some would 
Gynocentrism and Feminist Politics" (1985) 8 Women's Studies Internal Forum 173; A Miles, "The Integral Feminine Principle in North American Feminist Radicalism" (1981) 4 Women's Studies International Quarterly 481; and H. Eisenstein & A Jardine, eds, The Future of 
Difference (New York: Barnard College Women's Center, 1980). 
160 See, generally, Feminism in Canada, supra, note 146 and N. Adamson, L. Briskin & M. McPhail, Feminist Organizing for Change: The Contemporary Women's Movement in Canada (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
161 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women 's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982) [hereinafter Voice]; D.T. Meyers & E.F. K.ittay, eds, Women and Moral Theory (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987); D.A. Shogan, Care and Moral Motivation (Toronto: OISE Press, 1988). 
162 For an important discussion of the political significance of a continuum, see A Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" (1980) 5 Signs 631. 
163 See, for example, M.J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); AC. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Virtue, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); and C. Taylor, Philosophical 
Papers: Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
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say vacuous, understanding of the self are seen to be undesirable: 
an impoverished conception of the community, the pervasiveness of 
an instrumentalist approach to social interaction, increased anomie 
and alienation, the collapse of consensus, and the abandonment of 
any sense of a community nomos. 
How have feminists responded to this debate? On the one 
hand, liberalism with its emphasis on the individual and its 
aspirations to enhance liberty through the pursuit of freely chosen 
life plans, is clearly attractive to feminists in the light of a history 
of rigorous restraint. It provides a vital opportunity for women to 
free themselves from the constraints of a society that limits their 
potential. Liberal individualism holds out the promise of equal 
opportunity. Women have experienced the consensual nomos and 
they have unpacked the deeply embedded coercive nature of 
gemeinschaft relations. Feminists have recognized that the sense of 
shared values is more apparent than real. They are some people's 
values, i.e., men's, that are not just valued, but systemically and 
coercively enforced - publicly and privately - with the correlative 
devaluation, indeed repression, of women's values and aspirations. 
Viewed in this light, communitarianism may be male hegemony in a 
different guise. 
At the same time, liberalism, despite its attractions, is both 
problematic and insufficiently responsive. For some feminists, the 
monadic vision of the self simply does not ring true for their 
experiences of social interaction. Although they see the self as 
fundamentally important, that is only part of the story, in that vital 
elements of the self are based upon its capacity for human 
interconnection.164 On a more explicitly political level, the ideology 
of individualism is understood to be unresponsive to the existential 
needs of women because it leaves too much up to the particularized 
person, putting the burden of achievement completely on the 
individuated self. The problem with this approach is that it pays 
insufficient attention to the structures of inequality that frequently 
inhibit the achievement of the very values that liberalism purports to 
hold dear. To make individual self-fulfillment an obtainable ideal 
164 See Voice, supra, note 161 and N. Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: 
Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
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demands more than formal pretensions. It requires affirmative 
community support, that is, proactive state intervention, but that 
contradicts the liberal preference for neutrality. 
Thus, once again, feminism follows its tendency for non­
alignment: it refuses to fit nicely into the traditional structures and 
categories of politico-philosophical discourse. As Donna Greschner 
suggests, feminism's response to both communitarianism and 
individualism is "yes" and "no." There are elements in each tradition 
that feminism rejects and aspires to, but feminism cannot be 
identified with or reduced to either individualism or 
comm uni tarianism.165 
It seems to me that, depending on how you read him, Unger 
shares the same ambivalence as feminists about the 
individualism/communitarian debate. Although in Knowledge he 
advocated in favour of organic communities, drawing on a discourse 
and vision that had strong communitarian overtones, he appears to 
have abandoned this approach in Politics. In particular, he tends to 
identify communitarianism with a repressive corporatism and/or civic 
republicanism: "Consider what happens to the communal ideal when 
it must be realized in a setting of recalcitrant but also resented 
inequality. Every rebellion against dependence and domination takes 
on the character of a betrayal of communal bonds, whereas fidelity 
to these communal bonds requires submission to a hierarchal 
order."
166 Community, in this view, is "little more than the softening 
halo of a brutal power system."167 However, another response to 
the question of the connection between self and other that appears 
to have stayed with Unger throughout his work is the mediating 
concept of solidarity. Unfortunately, its meaning and significance 
appear to have gone through several, not necessarily compatible, 
transmutations. 
In his earliest work, Unger seems to understand solidarity as a 
substantive, normative vision for social interaction, a regulative ideal. 
165 D. Greschner, "Feminist Concerns with the New Communitarians: We Don't Need Another Hero" in AC. Hutchinson & LJ.M. Green, Law and the Community (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 119. 
166 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 387. 
167 Ibid. 
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For example, he describes it as "love struggling to move beyond the 
circle of intimacy ... our feeling of responsibility for those whose 
lives touch in some way upon our own and our greater or lesser 
willingness to share their fate." Or again: 
The kernel of solidarity is our feeling of responsibility for those whose lives touch in some way upon our own and our greater or lesser willingness to share in their fate. Solidarity is the social face of love: it is concern with another as a person rather than just respect for him [sic] as a bearer of formally equal rights and duties or admiration for his [sic] gifts and achiev�ments.168 
Understood in this strong substantive sense, solidarity suggests that 
we mediate (for we can never eliminate) the tension between self 
and other, not by a self-sacrificing of the self, nor by a callous 
disregard of the other, but by an earnest sense of responsibility for 
their destiny, a willingness to attempt to experience the world from 
their existential base, and further, to attempt to make the world 
more responsive to their needs. Read in this light, solidarity attempts 
to reconcile the alienating and latently destructive dualism of self 
and other.169 
I would suggest that such a conception of solidarity dovetails 
with the espousal by some feminists - for example Carol Gilligan 
and Joan Tronto170 - of an ethic of care. The central insight of an 
ethic of care is a consciousness of the constitutive interconnection 
and interdependence of the self and other. This sense of mutuality 
militates against isolation and separatism, with their potential for 
selfishness, aggression, and violence. An ethic of care encourages 
enthusiasm for an awareness of the needs of others, a willingness 
to respond compassionately and responsibly to those needs,171 and 
168 Knowledge, supra, note 6 at 206. 
169 Feminism in Canada, supra, note 146 at 29-31. 
l 70 J. Tronto, "Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care" (1987) 12 Signs 644; "Women and Caring: What Can Feminists Learn About Morality From Caring" in A Jaggar and S. Bordo, eds, Body Gender and Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and 
Knowing (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1989) 172; "Rationalizing Racism, Sexism, and Other Forms of Prejudice: Otherness in Moral and Feminist Theory" [unpublished manuscript]. 
171 Voice, supra, note 161 at 62, 74-98. 
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to participate in the lived experiences and reality of others.172 It 
identifies "a world of mutuality" that "creates and sustains the human 
community."173 It reconceptualizes and reconstructs moral dilemmas 
to be issues of competing responsibilities of the self because of its 
connection with and responsibility for others, rather than a conflict 
between self and other in which the only options are assertion of 
the selfs trumping rights or martyred self-sacrifice on the pyre of 
altruism.174 For Gilligan, the ethic of care aspires to "a more 
generative view of human life,"175 one that rejects freedom that is 
built on the back of subordination and thereby pursues an 
affirmative transformation of the polity. 
However, it is important to point out that, on my 
understanding, the ethic of care is distinct from the traditional 
masculinist stereotype of "female self-abnegation and moral self­
. sacrifice,"176 what Virginia Woolf has described as "The Angel in the 
172 Ibid. at 79. A similar theme can also be located in M. Minow, "Justice Engendered" 
(1987) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10 at 14: "the commitment to seek out and appreciate a perspective 
other than one's own." 
173 Voice, ibid. at 156. 
174 Ibid. at 114. 
175 Ibid. at 174. 
1 76 Ibid. at 9. See also, I. Marcus & P. Spielgelman, "Feminist Discourse, Moral Values 
and the Law - A Conversation" (1985) 34 Buffalo L. Rev. 46 (hereinafter Discourse]. 
Deborah Keams suggests that even the most sophisticated and progressive liberal of the late 
twentieth century incorporates a vision of women as self-sacrificing into his work: see "A 
Theory of Justice - and Love; Rawls on the Family" (1983) 18 Politics 36. For a powerful 
critique of this "denial" interpretation of women's identity, see Robin West's groundbreaking 
article ''The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Liberal 
and Radical Feminist Legal Theory" Wisconsin Women's L.J. (forthcoming). West argues 
that, if women are accurately understood as "giving selves," this has come about because of 
the "pervasive threat of violent and acquisitive male sexuality'' which has resulted in women 
driven by fear "re-constituting themselves in a way that controls the danger and suppresses the 
fear.... This does not make her an altruistic person, it makes her a negative." Ibid. at 15, 22. 
In other words, women's identity as "giving selves" is a "coherent, understandable" defence 
mechanism to survive patriarchal oppression, not authentic feminism. As the text makes clear, 
the ethic of care approach does not reduce women to an interpretation as "giving selves," it 
is not a servile interpretation of women's moral character and promise. Indeed, later in her 
paper West also considers the possibility of an ethic of care absent the dangers of patriarchy. 
Ibid. at 38. See also her reflections on the importance of trust in human relations: Ibid. at 
61-62. 
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House."177 It should not be confused with passivity or delicacy, 
submissiveness or obedience, dependence or domesticity. It is 
neither what Irigaray has posited to be a "phallic feminine,"1 78 nor 
"a romantic prescription for chaining women to the classical 
definition of femininity."179 Indeed, Gilligan's own example refutes 
such self-negation, for at least some of the women to whom she 
listened had had abortions, thereby demonstrating that care does not 
necessarily prioritize the other over the self. Rather, it attempts to 
consider the interests of the other in a responsive and responsible 
manner. Thus, although the ethic of care necessitates a keen 
consciousness of the "social consequences of action,"180 it also 
includes care for oneself.181 
If the ethic of care and solidarity share as much in common as 
I have suggested they do, then the homology allows us to mediate 
the concern raised by some feminists that the ethic of care is at 
bottom male ventriloquism: the only place that women are allowed 
to be, because that is all that men, in their politico-cultural 
supremacy, have valued women for. Catharine MacKinnon is a 
leading advocate of this perspective. She argues that it is impossible 
to articulate the authentic voice of women because "the foot is on 
the throat," suggesting that an espousal of the ethic of care as a 
1 77 V. Woolf, Virginia Woolf- Women and Writing (London: Women's Press, 1979) at 59. 
178 Feminism in France, supra, note 159 at 87. 
179 K. Karst, "Women's Constitution" (1984) Duke LJ. 447 at 480. Emphatically, although there is some verbal intersection, the ethic of care is not what MacKinnon has described as "contemporary industrial society's version of woman ... docile, soft, passive, nurturant, vulnerable, weak narcissistic, childlike, incompetent, masochistic and domestic, made for child care, home care and husband care." See "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory" (1982) 7 Signs 515 at 530. Moreover, lest there be any confusion, I want to stress that nothing in my suggestions is premised upon the idea that the ethic of care grows out of the rosy private family life of women. For many women, the family is anything but "a haven in a heartless world." It is, in many instances, itself the locus of extreme domination, subordination, inequality, and violence. 
180 Voice, supra, note 161 at 167. 
181 Ibid. at 139. 
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feminist ethic may be an insidious strategy of anti-feminism.182 
Solidarity, or its cognate the ethic of care, need not be the 
imposition of a disempowering male stereotype upon women. 
Instead, we can conceive of it as a corrigible vision of reconstruction 
for progressive persons of both genders to pursue, a vision that 
capitulates to neither communitarianism nor individualism. 
In this way, Unger, or more accurately the younger Unger, can 
make a positive contribution to feminism in its attempt to resolve 
tension between self and other: a contribution that provides the 
foundation for a corrigible substantive societal vision capable of 
challenging the cynical, fatalistic twilightenment ideology, but one 
that is in no way premised upon biological determinism. As we shall 
see in my discussion of the potential feminist critique, unfortunately 
the older Unger appears to retreat from such a strong conception of 
solidarity. 
C. Institutional Reconstruction 
Another vitally important contribution which Unger can make 
to feminism is his proposals for institutional reconstruction. As we 
have seen, Unger's primary criticism of the basic structure of society 
is that its institutions are primarily preservative: they are designed 
to reinforce existing cultural patterns, rather than to change them. 
Women are obviously disadvantaged by such structural 
conservativism. Unger's alternative is to remake the basic structure 
so as to be structure-revising, rather than structure-preserving. 
Women could potentially benefit from such reconstructive openness, 
in that the basic structure would be rendered more congenial to 
their differential demands. In this section, I will provide only a few 
illustrative examples, one each from the economic, legal and political 
realms of social interaction. Many other suggestions could be found. 
182 See "Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination" in Feminism Unmodified, 
supra, note 149 at 32. If authenticity is identified with essentialism, then MacKinnon has a 
point. But I don't think Gilligan, for example, is attempting to make such a universal or total 
claim. 
1990] A Critical Review of Unger's Politics 701 
1. Economic 
a) Liquefaction of task-definition and task-execution 
Take, for example, Unger's proposals that the conditions of 
labour be rendered more plastic by softening the distinction between 
task-definition and task-execution and that greater financial support 
be provided by the state through the rotating capital fund for 
innovative workers, technicians, or entrepreneurs. As the economic 
structure is currently set up, it is difficult for women either to make 
it into the centralized ranks of decision makers183 or to successfully 
enter or remain i.n the market as independent actors. Increasingly, 
in part due to their gradually increasing autonomy and driven by the 
necessity of the feminization of poverty, women are attempting to 
make a go of it on their own in the market. Frequently, these 
women entrepreneurs do not draw any line between task-definition 
and task-execution and they could certainly benefit from the support 
of the rotating capital fund with its ability to decentralize market 
power. Moreover, Unger's insistence on the "perpetual breakdown 
of status and hierarchy" reinforces the dynamic to undermine sex 
role stereotyping by providing opportunities for women to develop 
their potentials for self-assertion, to be innovative and dynamic. 
As far as my research has gone, feminist scholars and activists 
have not devoted much energy to the task of proposing macro­
economic reconstruction,184 a lacuna in their practice that is 
particularly worrisome ( although from another perspective 
understandable) given the centrality of economics in structuring 
social interaction. Unger's proposals could therefore prove very 
helpful in this arena. 
183 R. Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 
184 For some tentative suggestions, see, however, Women's Poverty, supra, note 109; B. Bergman, "Feminism and Economics" (1983) 69(5) Academe 22; N.J. Sokoloff, Between Money 
and Love: The Dialectics of Women's Home and Market Work (New York: Praeger, 1980); and C.C. Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, 
and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
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2. Legal 
a) Disaggregation of the consolidated property right 
[VOL. 28 NO. 3 
Similarly, Unger's undoubtedly controversial proposal for the 
disaggregation of the consolidated property right could be of crucial 
importance for women, both imaginatively and economically. The 
consolidated property right is the idea that property has one 
essential meaning: the property owner has an exclusive, 
unchallengeable, permanent, possessive right to subjects or objects. 
Unger denies the hegemony of this conception of property, positing 
that other variations on the idea of a property right are conceivable, 
workable, and desirable if we really do aspire to a more egalitarian 
society. Unger's disaggregated property right allows for conditional 
individual and group claims to portions of the social capital. 
I would suggest that many males premise their interactions with 
females, both intimate and removed, within the paradigm of the 
consolidated property right. Whether they interact with women as 
companions or as others who provide services, there may be an 
instrumentalism in such relationships that denies the equality and 
integrity of women. In so far as the disaggregation of the 
consolidated property right would decentre the ideology of 
dehumanizing, possessive instrumentality, it provides scope for the 
improvement of women's lives. 
Further, the consolidated property right, as an instrument of 
domination, impacts on women's life experiences in another more 
tangible way. One of the greatest problems for women on divorce 
has been the amounts of and access to income and maintenance 
payments and the resultant phenomenon of the feminization of 
poverty.185 A central reason for this problem is that malestream 
thinking about the division of property and ongoing support after 
the dissolution of marriage is premised in part upon the ideology of 
the consolidated property right. This translates into the deeply 
embedded belief that the property is really the husband's - especially 
if the woman is a homemaker - and that it is only in the interest 
185 L.J. Wietzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic 
Consequences for Women and Children in America (New York: Free Press, 1985). 
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of formal equality and fairness that we are redistributing his wealth 
for her benefit. Such a preconception reinforces a reluctance to be 
too generous to the wife and to fully consider what her real needs 
might be in a society which still systematically discriminates against 
women. However, if we no longer clung to such a possessive 
conception of property, if we reinterpreted property rights in a more 
open and contingent manner, if we understood wealth as societal 
rather than possessive and individualistic, if women could claim both 
destabilization and solidarity rights, then perhaps their economic 
situation post-divorce may not be so strained.186 
b) Equality of Circumstance 
And again, Unger's proposal that the state guarantee a 
minimum of welfare entitlements to provide "equality of circum­
stance" helps to undermine the economic coercion which forces 
some women to remain in unfulfilling or harmful relationships. It 
would also allow other women the opportunity to experiment with 
and develop alternative lifestyles to those which restrict them to the 
confines of gender stereotyping. 
What these discussions of Unger's economic and legal proposals 
indicate is that a reconstruction of the economy - on the basis of 
the disaggregation of the consolidated property right and the 
establishment of a rotating capital fund, supported by a regime of 
destabilization, solidarity, and welfare rights - though, perhaps, 
incapable of eradicating the feminization of poverty, can make a 
significant contribution. It is a contribution that feminists simply 
cannot afford to ignore in the light of liberal reform agendas that, 
even in their best light, have not produced the expected results or, 
less optimistically, have backfired. 
186 There is, of course, a downside risk for some women in the abandonment of the consolidated property right. Some of the main benefactors of the women's movement have been middle class women, whose access to wealth and power is dependent upon the consolidated property right. Inevitably, they may lose out. But I think feminism must make a choice between gaining access to the politics of privilege or attempting to reconstruct the polity itself. 
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3. Political 
a) Liquefaction: feminism and constitutional reform 
A couple of examples from the political realm might also help. 
The Ungerian critique of the contemporary political structure and 
processes echoes the critique of economic and legal relations: they 
are conservative, preservative, and anti-democratic. Nowhere does 
this become more obvious than through a reflection upon the nature 
of constitutions: .because of their importance they tend to be 
inflexible, requiring exceptional procedures for transformation. To 
avoid the sclerosis induced by such "demobilizing 
constitutionalism,"187 Unger suggests that we liquefy the distinction 
between entrenched constitutional politics and a more volatile 
normal politics. 
Feminists, I suggest, could be benefactors of such a liquefaction. 
Take, for example, the efforts of Canadian feminists to have their 
equality rights entrenched in the Cha,ter, the resistance, and the 
extraordinary lengths they were required to go, both provincially and 
federally, to achieve recognition.188 Witness also, their 
marginalization throughout the Meech Lake constitutional process 
through which eleven men came to an agreement which, if ratified, 
will render constitutional reform almost impossible.189 
Or again, we can reflect on the impact of the American 
constitutional structure on the campaign for the ERA. The 
mobilization generated by feminists was phenomenal, having a major 
impact on local and state politics, but coming up against the brick 
wall of the procedures of constitutional amendment.190 If 
187 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 459. 
188 C. Hosek, "How Canadian Women Fought for Equality" in K. Banting & R. Simeon, eds, And No One Cheered: Fetkralism, Democracy and the Constitution Act (Toronto: Methuen, 1983); P. Kome, The Taking of Twenty-Eight: Women Challenge the Constitution (Toronto: Women's Press, 1983). 
189 A Dobrowolsky, Promises Unfulfilled: Women and the Theory and Practice of Representative Democracy in Canada (M.A Thesis, Political Science, Dalhousie University, 1990) [unpublished] [hereinafter Promises). 
190 J. Mansbridge, JWty We Lost the ERA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
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liquefaction had taken place, if constitutional politics were structured 
so as to be more responsive and less resistant to demands for social 
and political change, then constitutionally sanctioned inequality 
would possibly not be a foundation for the contemporary American 
polity. 
Moreover, such openness would encourage greater recourse to 
the institutions of participatory democracy and would enable those 
groups who are discriminated against in society to be less dependent 
on the paternalistic good will of lesser democratic bodies, such as 
the courts. 
VI. FEMINIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNGER 
A. The Trashing Job 
Despite all of these potential correspondences between Unger 
and the feminist agenda, for some reason that I simply cannot 
understand, Unger leaves himself open to an easy trashing job by 
feminists. 
He, too, is guilty of all the sins of omission that feminists have 
identified as characteristic of malestream ideology. Rarely does he 
adopt gender neutral language and even less occasionally is there 
any specific discussion of gender related issues. Although he spends 
hundreds of pages discussing production, the economy, and work, 
issues such as reproduction, the sexual division of labour, and their 
fundamental economic significance never get a mention. At other 
times, he discusses the "main traditions" of political thought -
liberalism, libertarianism, socialism, communitarianism, communism, 
social democracy, even civic republicanism - but with nary a 
reference to feminism. Viewed in this light, the parallels with Kant, 
Hegel, and Marx may be less than flattering.191 
Moreover, I suspect that one of the things that feminists will 
have heard about Politics is the reference, in manuscript form, to the 
parallel between Ungerian empowerment and de Sadean sexual 
191 L. Clark & L. Lange, eds, The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and 
Reproduction from Plato to Nietzche (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979). 
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innovation. No doubt, a good feminist deconstructionist could 
unpack this now omitted reference192 to unmask Unger's anti­
feminism and to cast him onto the already overflowing scrap-heap of 
unsalvagable malestream ideology. 
However, I think such a response would be too hasty. For 
although there is much in Politics that can be criticized from a 
feminist perspective, as I have indicated, there is also much that 
merits serious attention if feminism aspires to make its own 
transformative vision realizable. What I want to do in this section 
is to discuss some of the critical contributions which feminists can 
make to Unger that will be to their mutual benefit. 
B. The Assumption of Conflict 
Undoubtedly, one of the things that feminists will notice about 
Politics is the disturbingly adversarial discourse adopted by Unger. 
The treatise is pervaded by a truculent and belligerent vocabulary. 
For example "war " "assault " "fighting " "smashing " "crack " ' ' ' ' ' ' 
"dismember," and "shatter" provide some of the fundamental 
metaphors of the work. In and of itself, such terminology may not 
merit too great a concern. However, it appears to be symptomatic 
of . a much more fundamental aspect of the Ungerian agenda. As 
Jill McCalla Vickers asks: "why [is] Western man's conception of 
himself, of us, and of nature so destructive?"193 
Unger is very explicit that the programme of reconstruction 
will require conflict, if only for the reason that those who benefit 
from cultural conditions as currently constituted will be reluctant to 
surrender their advantages. But he also goes much further in 
arguing that for progress to be realizable, conflict must continue: 
"The path to equality passes through conflict. Otherwise it is likely 
to lead to a mirage."194_ Within this Ungerian scheme of things, it 
seems that conflict is the very kernel of our transgressive potential, 
the guarantee of our irrepressible ability for individual self assertion 
192 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 579. 
193 Feminism in Canada, supra, note 146 at 28. 
194 Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 67. 
,, 
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and breach of context, the dynamic that "keeps us infinite within the 
finite." Indeed, he seems to go so far as to claim that this talent for 
context smashing, filtered through the matrix of societal conflict, is 
the empowering fulcrum of our potential as human beings. Without 
it we would stagnate. 
Unger does recognize that some will object to this stance, in 
particular, he identifies classical republicans with such a critique.195 
His response is that the republican vision of consensus is a myth, 
that republicanism has never been a realistic political possibility, and 
that consensus theory legitimates hierarchy, domination, and 
disciplinary conservativism. For Unger, "the denaturalization of 
society through conflict"196 has the advantage of historical precedent 
and successes that have resulted in extended emancipation. 
Although there is truth in Unger's position, it is also 
problematic. We must not forget that conflict also has a history of 
subordination and domination, imperialism and violence, genocide 
and torture. This side of conflict cannot be simply hidden in the 
closet of history. Moreover, it is interesting that Unger should 
choose republicanism as his foil, when at least some feminists are 
concerned about the negative consequences of conflict on both the 
micro and macro levels.197 As Catharine MacKinnon has 
sardonically noted, "Conflict [may be] a peculiarly ejaculatory means 
of conflict resolution."198 More specifically, why should the choice 
be between conflict and consensus? Could we not understand 
peoples' differing perspectives and disagreements as socio-political 
tensions emerging from our differing experiences, interests, and 
desires, as disputes necessitating resolution? Such a perspective 
acknowledges the lack of consensus, but does not necessarily 
embrace as inevitable an assumption of conflict. As Gilligan's 
research on women's decision-making in relation to abortion 
suggests, interests may be incompatible, even irreconcilable, but that 
195 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 558, 586-87. 
196 Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 52. 
197 He suggests that alternative viewpoints are "literally incredible," a position that is clearly premised upon on the complete absence of feminism from his analysis. False Necessity, 
supra, note 3 al 560. 
198 Discourse, supra, note 176 at 23. 
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need not necessarily result in a conflictual understanding of the 
process.199 And what of Unger's own idea of solidarity? What is the 
relationship between solidarity and conflict? 
C. The Retreat from Solidarity 
As I indicated earlier, the young Unger developed a strong 
conception of solidarity, relying on it as a partial foundation for his 
programme of reconstruction. Solidarity, as a cognate of love, as a 
response to the needs of others, as an alternative formulation for 
the ethic of care, does not fit well with Unger's more recent 
celebrations of conflict. 
This lack of fit can only be explained if we understand Unger's 
later work as backing away from such a strong conception of 
solidarity towards a more tentative perspective. In Passion, the 
concept seems to transmute from a regulative ideal for the 
mediation of the tensions of social interaction to a restatement or 
reformulation of the tensions themselves. Unger's powerful 
discussions of the "genealogy of the passions," in that essay, is built 
around his understanding of our shared experiences as human 
beings, of our unlimited mutual need and fear, longing and jeopardy, 
interdependence and vulnerability, which he describes as "the 
problem of solidarity." Although the book makes clear Unger's own 
preference - that we should develop our lives and our society so as 
to be more open to the redemptive power of love, towards greater 
trust and vulnerability - his approach characterizes solidarity as the 
problem, not the solution. Solidarity and love are now disconnected. 
The dualism which solidarity had originally sought to mediate 
appears to have been revived. 
This retreat from solidarity, as it might be called, is further 
reinforced through an analysis of Politics. Although solidarity does 
continue to maintain a position in the Ungerian scheme of things, 
it is lamentably underdeveloped. It is more a subterranean 
aspiration than a mediating corrective vision. Unger does provide 
that solidarity rights should be constitutionally encouraged and that 
199 
Voice, supra, note 161. 
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law, more generally, should reinforce the dynamic of reliance and 
trust. Moreover, the closing four pages of the centrepiece work 
False Necessity once again return to the problematic relationship 
between empowerment and solidarity to suggest obliquely that the 
two need not be incompatible.200 Apart from these rather sparse 
references,2°1 the remainder of this one thousand page opus is 
preoccupied with his espousal of unmitigated conflict. 
The problem then, as I see it, is that Unger has lost control 
of the idea of conflict. Conflict has taken on a life of its own in 
Politics. It has been elevated to the level of a generative and 
indefatigable imperative that comes dangerously close to an 
authoritarian impulse that trammels any other mediating concept. 
Viewed from this perspective, the destructive potential latent in 
dualistic thought (the conflict between self and other) comes front 
and centre threatening to eradicate completely the countervailing, 
mediating, and directive power of solidarity. To me, this comes 
close to a depressing surrender to necessitarianism and an 
unjustifiably impoverished "vision for society and project for 
individuals. "202 
D. Power and Plasticity 
These reflections on conflict also suggest that attention should 
be paid to Unger's conception of power. Despite the rhetoric of 
"empowerment," Politics betrays a unilateral conception of power. 
It understands power in the Weberian sense of "power over,"203 a 
200 Disturbingly, the last word of False Necessity, is a failed attempt to revive any hope we might have for solidarity, for solidarity transmutes to "sweet." Supra, note 3 at 595. 
201 Unger does admit that solidarity is "downplayed" and that empowerment ii la Politics "fails to make up the whole of a defensible social ideal." However, this turns out to be more of a strategy of confession and avoidance, than an attempt to come to terms with this lacuna; 
Ibid. at 592. 
202 Ibid. at 571. 
203 Weber defines power as "the chance of a man or a number of men (sic] to realize their will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action." See H.H. Gerth & C.W. Mills, eds, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958) at 180. 
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negative and repressive approach, what Foucault identifies as a 
juridical conception to power.204 But power is more than simply 
pervasive and systemic, it is also heterogeneous, polymorphous, and 
multifaceted.205 Power can also be understood in the sense of 
"power to" as well as "power over." "Power to" is power as a 
cognate of freedom, a progressive, emancipatory, and potentially 
transformative conception of power: a conception which emphasizes 
the creative, capacity-enhancing, ability-encouraging variations of 
power.206 This is a qualitatively different conception of power, one 
that correlates more closely with the concept of "empowerment." 
204 M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, trans. C. Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) [hereinafter Power/K,1owledge). 
205 The following reflections on power are influenced in part by the work of Foucault. He suggests that traditional conceptions of power are based upon three assumptions: (1) 
power is possessed; (2) power is primarily coercive, it is a repressive prohibition backed by sanctions; and (3) power is centralized and tends to be hierarchical, it flows from the top down. Foucault argues that these assumptions unduly constrain our understanding of power, that power has many variations beyond the juridical conception. Thus, he argues first that 
power is exercised rather than possessed, thereby emphasizing a more relational understanding of power. Second, we can understand power is productive as well as repressive. This claim becomes most apparent through his discussion of the connection between knowledge and power. Knowledge as power constructs, creates, and moulds our understandings of ourselves, our relations, and our world. Power, therefore, can be proactive and creative, rather than just sanction-determined. Third, and as a correlative of his first and second theses, if power is exercisable, relational, and creative, then it can be located elsewhere than in centralized authorities. Put differently, power is a micro-phenomenon as well as a macro-phenomenon (although the two are interrelated). It can be exercised through our everyday relations, from the bottom up, as well as from the top down, as localized centres of resistance, reconstruction, and empowerment, as well as domination, either on the micro or macro levels. See M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, supra, note 204; Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); The History of Sexuality (New York: Vintage Books, 1980); J. Sawicki, "Foucault and Feminism: Toward a Politics of Difference" (1986) 2 Hypatia 23; and I. Diamond & L. Quinby, eds, Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988). Though I do not propose some meta-normative project, I am also more optimistic than Foucault who resists envisioning transformation, mostly because of his anti-humanism, his post-modern skepticism. 
206 Y. Cohen, '"Thoughts on Women and Power" in Feminism in Canada, supra note 146 at 236. G. Finn, "On the Oppression of Women in Philosophy - Or, Whatever Happened to Objectivity?" in ibid. at 302. For example, certain of the privileges of citizenship can be understood as "power to," rather than "power over." The Oxford English Dictionary also suggests these various conceptions, beginning with "power to," but ending with "power over": "the ability to do something ... possession of control or command over others; domination; government; sway; authority ... ability to compel obedience ... wage war." 
; 
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Men may understand and use power in its imperialistic guise in 
order to crush women, other men, and nature, but that does not 
mean that "power over" is the immutable essence of power. 
Feminism, with its substantive emphasis upon an ethic of care, may 
pose the opportunity to conceptualize another, emancipatory side of 
power: a side that expands our horizons rather than curtails them, 
a side that nurtures our personhood rather than stultifies it, a side 
that fosters care for the inherent human i dignity of others. 
Feminism, rather than working within and thereby reproducing the 
androcentric interpretation/imposition of power, may be able to 
challenge the very meaning of power itself.207 
These concerns are further reinforced on a reading of Plasticity. 
In this volume, Unger utilizes his anti-necessitarian perspective to 
develop a revised practice of social and historical analysis that at 
once has greater explanatory potential than its strongest rivals 
(Marxism or modernization theory), as well as emphasizing the 
human capacity for innovation, flexibility, and reconstruction. The 
central thesis is that there is no pre-ordained path to societal 
success. Rather, it is argued that those societies that have been 
successful have been those who have recognized the importance of 
plasticity - with its potential to weaken social division, roles, and 
hierarchy - thereby facilitating the emergence of hitherto unforseen 
innovations, the techniques of success. By connecting plasticity with 
success, Unger links openness, empowerment, and radical democracy. 
The problems begin, however, not with the theory but with its 
application. Plasticity is a study of the enabling institutional 
conditions of economic and military success. Although Unger's 
purpose is relatively narrow historical revision, his choice of topics 
leaves me rather uncomfortable. Unger's perilously close 
identification, of wealth and power with success, in my opinion, raises 
207 It must be made clear that the extension of our understanding of power suggested in the text is not a sentimentalized, romanticized approach. It is obvious to me that, if "power over'' and "power to" come into direct conflict, then the former will trump the latter. The opportunity, however, that is implicated in the idea of "power to" is precisely to circumvent and defuse the conflicts that make "power over" seem so inevitable and the consequences so repressive, painful. In this light, power undimensionalized to "power over'' is self-fulfilling and viciously circular. To break that circle, we must reconceive the possibilities of dispute resolution, to challenge the pervasiveness of dominance and dependence at its cognitive and epistemological core. 
712 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 28 NO. 3 
issues about his vision of the good society, concerns that relate back 
to his almost euphoric espousals of conflict.208 I want to 
concentrate on his discussions of military success. 
No doubt, Unger is correct to identify the integral historical 
connections between societal SUivival, growth, and expansion on the 
one hand, with wealth and power, riches and . force, on the other. 
Yet there is a disturbing tendency to uncritically assume such 
connections as inevitable, necessary. For example, throughout the 
discussions there is a pervasive assumption that predatory 
relationships between states are inevitable.209 This leads him to 
claim that successful societies should always be in a state of military 
preparedness, which, to me, sounds like a euphemism •for militarism, 
thanatical doublespeak.210 Thus, the recent efforts of Gorbachev to 
modify the military tensions between the superpowers would be seen 
as foolish and potentially fatal within the Ungerian scheme of things. 
Unger's espousal of "plasticity or death"211 could be easily 
interpreted as a justification for deterrence theory, the Reagan/Bush 
administration's star wars initiative, the further development of the 
new "invisible bomber," and continued nuclear build up, either 
through the honing of cruise missiles or the serious consideration by 
the Mulroney administration of the development of a fleet of 
nuclear submarines. Furthermore, Unger's discourse of cold, 
dispassionate detachment in his discussion of the techniques and 
technologies of destruction on occasion almost crescendos into 
eulogy. For example, he is particularly enthusiastic about the ability 
of commando forces to transcend hierarchy by softening the 
208 For example, at one point he describes the "repetition of war" as the "great wheel of fortune." Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 147. 
209 See also Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 56. 21° For some useful feminist reflections on militarism and pacifism, see S. Ruddick, "Preservative Love and Military Destruction" in J. Trebilcot, ed., Mothering: Essays in Feminist 
Theory (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984) 231; S. Ruddick, "Pacifying the Forces: Drafting Women in the Interests of Peace" (1983) 8 Signs 471; D. Kruse & C. Sowerwine, "Feminism and Pacifism: 'Women's Sphere' in Peace and War" in N. Grieve & A Burns, eds, 
Australian Wom�n: New Feminist Perspectives (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 42; and N. Hartsock, ''The Barracks Community in Western Political Thought: Prologomena to a Feminist Critique of War and Politics" in J. Stiehm, ed., Women and Men's Wars (New York: Permagon Press, 1983) at 283. 
21l Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 162. 
.. 
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boundary between task-definition and task-execution. Immediately, 
I am tempted to think of the plasticity, creativity, and ingenuity of 
the R.u.c Special Branch shoot to kill policy in my native Northern 
Ireland, where the execution aspect has been perfected into an 
art.212 I am not enthusiastic about celebrating such destructive 
innovation. 
To be fair to Unger, there are at times indications that he is 
not indefensibly sanguine about war. Although he refers to war's 
"untrammelled violence" and its nightmarish aspects, critiquing 
combat as "a retreat from love" and its "distorting nature," these 
reservations are disturbingly underdeveloped. For someone whose 
other work is in many ways premised upon the redemptive power 
of love, optimistic about compassion, trust, reliance, and 
vulnerability, he simply does not protest enough. Although we can 
undoubtedly learn about the importance of plasticity through a 
discussion of militarism - and I do not want to be understood as 
saying that we should not discuss . or attempt to understand our 
history - Unger's position lacks a sufficiently critical component. 
His critique is oriented against alternative theories of military 
success, but not against militarism itself.213 His over-concentration 
on the techniques of plasticity costs his critical credentials severely. 
Rather than attempting to uncouple freedom and domination, his 
espousals of plasticity only seem to rationalize the efficiency of 
domination, to capitulate to the "cult of violence."214 It is a sad 
thought, but Ungerian plasticity, unmodified as it is in Plasticity, may 
only differ in degree from Posnerian efficiency. Like Conrad's Mr. 
Kurtz, Mr. Unger may realize the horror only when its too late. 
The problem with Plasticity is not its central thesis, the 
unimaginable horizons opened up by plasticity, but the extent to 
which the thesis is carried. Unger may have led us out of our 
servitude to necessitarianism, opened up the waters of reform and 
retrenchment which continually threaten to submerge us, and 
provided guidance toward a better era, but only to abandon us in 
212 J. Stalker, Stalker (London: Harrap, 1988). 
213 "[T]he test of success that counts is the comparison of one war machine or industrial economy with its closest and most threatening adversaries." Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 209. 
214 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 584-85. 
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the valley of mutually inflicted death. All too often his third volume 
seems to suggest that conflict and militarism are essential conditions 
for success. Success is defined as economic and military power, but 
why should this be the case? If success is to be measured on these 
criteria, with their potential for apocalyptic destruction, then, 
perhaps, we don't want success or, perhaps, we need to redefine and 
revalorize success to disentangle it from such a warped value 
structure. If the gospel of plasticity is accurate, if necessitarianism 
is part of the problem not the solution, then the spirit of the 
Ungerian . project demands that we question the assumption of 
conflict that Unger entrenches in his own work so that we can 
tentatively edge towards social recombination that does not require 
seemingly endless baptisms of violence. To do this requires us to 
inquire into the very nature of the modernist project itself, to query 
whether our much vaunted progress is more apparent than real, to 
wonder whether our achievements have been attained only at an 
unconscionable cost, and to ponder whether our economic and 
military successes have been self-deluding myths. 
E. Plasticity is not Enough 
Here, once again, I think Unger fails us. As I have indicated 
earlier, Unger, with his unrepenting emphasis upon malleability and 
the creative potential of humanity, is an archmodernist. The 
problem that arises, I think, is that throughout his analysis there is 
a dangerous tendency to reduce this creative capacity of humanity to 
instrumentalism.215 His over-concentration on and, perhaps, 
excessive prioritization of the self-assertive potential, the context­
transcending talent, is disturbingly close to a will to empowerment 
that lacks a sufficiently developed complement of intersubjectivity. 
The fusion of reason and desire is too narrowly construed, over- · 
215 This concern about the ascendency of instrumentalist reason grows out of another tradition of critical theory, most commonly identified with the Frankfurt School. See, generally, T. Adorno & M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. J. Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1972); T. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973); and M. Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: Continuum, 1974); J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J.J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971). 
r 
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emphasizing technique at the expense of interconnection. For 
example, his discourse is pervaded by terms that discuss mastery of 
our contexts, whether economic, political, military, ecological, or 
interpersonal. Even his theory is reduced to serfdom, press-ganged 
into the "service of radical democracy."216 It is, perhaps, because 
of this instrumentalist hegemony that Unger puts so much emphasis 
upon the importance of wealth and power, unduly prioritizing them 
as the fundamental aspects of success,217 thereby denying that things 
could be otherwise. 
All of these problems are compounded and exacerbated by 
Unger's own vital insight into what he calls "the demonic problem of 
politics: the tendency of means to create their own ends."218 If 
conflict is the m�ans, then conflict will be the end. Conflict has as 
its central concern and effect inequality, for it is premised upon 
adversariness and driven by the polarities of victory and defeat, 
domination and subordination. If Unger is right, and I think he is, 
that there is no social teleology, that although everything is up for 
grabs, there is no guarantee that the future will necessarily turn out 
to be positive, that "each advance towards greater plasticity and 
disentrenchment creates new dangers of reversion to less revisable 
and more oppressive orderings of social life,"219 and that the burden 
is upon us as historically responsible social actors, then surely 
contextualism and plasticity need some direction. The "relentless 
imperative of plasticity"220 is not enough, for, as even he admits, 
talented conservative reformers can use it to reinforce their 
privilege. 
Two brief examples help illustrate in a dramatic way the 
political limitations of an unmodified plasticity. We will remember 
that Unger is sanguine about the radical potential of the petty 
216 See subtitle of False Necessity, supra, note 3. 217 That Unger believes militarism is necessary for statecraft becomes obvious when, for example, he identifies achievement in "rule, production and war" as ''worldly success." 
Plastic ity, supra, note 6 at 102. 
218 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 396. 
2l9 Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 213. 220 Ibid. at 59. 
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bourgeoisie mostly because of their innovative and experimental 
tendencies, that is, their propensity for plasticity. Let us not forget, 
however, that it was the petty bourgeoisie who also provided the 
vanguard for European fascism. The second example, from the 
Canadian context, is of particular relevance to women and other 
disempowered groups. In the realm of constitutionalism, Unger 
dislikes the arthritic system of checks and balances and favours a 
process that will allow for rapid and effective decision-making that 
can encourage "bold programmatic experiments."221 Just such an 
experiment in constitutional innovation took place at Meech Lake, 
where a sort of super-council of "eleven men met in private in the 
night while their limousines waited outside, engines running."222 The 
result was an Accqrd that has a potentially massive impact upon the 
politico-constitutional status of women, the northern territories, and 
natives, absent their participation and, seemingly, oblivious to their 
concerns.223 
Plasticity needs to be supplemented by a substantive vision,224 
corrigible no doubt, that can provide us with guidance as to the 
direction of our political, economic, and cultural reconstruction. In 
particular, I think that the Ungerian project requires a revitalization 
of his earlier strong conception of solidarity, a commitment to 
seriously consider recent feminist contributions to politico­
jurisprudential discourse and praxis, and a dramatic expansion of his 
221 Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 85. 
222 R. McCamey, National Vice-President, Federal Liberal Party, quoted in "Critics Want Chance to Press for Revisions" The [Toronto} Globe and Mail (4 June 1987) at 11. 
223 See generally, Promises, supra, note 189. 
224 The suggestion in the text that Unger tends to favour process over substance is a correlative of his anti-essentialist commitment, in that any substantive ideal continually threatens to become a metaprinciple. The reproduction of this epistemological hierarchy is manifest in, for example, the following comments on the relationship between contextualism and equality: We come to recognize the ideal of social equality, for example, as a partial, subsidiary aspect of our effort to free ourselves from a social script that both subordinates us unnecessarily to an overpowering scheme of class, communal, gender, and national divisions and denies us as individuals, as groups, and as whole societies a greater mastery over the institutional and imaginative contexts of our lives. This enlarged view of the radical cause. 
Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 7. 
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conception of empowerment so as to make it less overdetermined by 
juridicalism and more a cognate of freedom. In this way, it may be 
possible to both reconnect solidarity and empowerment and 
uncouple freedom and subordination. When I discuss solidarity and 
the ethic of care, it is not to set up a new authoritarian orthodoxy, 
a neo-naturalistic determining metaprinciple.225 Rather, they are 
developed as corrigible, normative, and experiential bench-marks 
intended to inspire and facilitate empowerment, helping us to 
apprehend the reality of the other, as well as ourselves.226 Thus, 
although they are aspirational generative principles, they only 
provide indications of the general direction in which we should 
move, not authoritative right answers.227 
Thus, contrary to his own guiding idea, Unger may have bought 
into a necessitarian belief that conflict is inevitable, a credo that may 
be traced to his androcentricity, his excessive predilection with 
individual self-assertion, his fetishization of plasticity, his retreat from 
solidarity, his ignorance of the ethic of care, and his over­
concentration on history to the exclusion of an alternative heritage. 
Unger has failed to realize that perhaps one of the most pervasive 
and recalcitrant elements of our contemporary formative contexts is 
patriarchy, and has thus become a victim of his own myopia. 
Indeed, the absence (or at least the underdevelopment) of a 
reconstructive norm, such as solidarity in Politics, makes one wonder 
if it may be no more than the restatement of the philosophical and 
political origins of the Enlightenment, failing to persuade that the 
Ungerian empowered democracy may be any less "solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short" than the Hobbesian Leviathan. 
225 Which is, I suspect, the Ungerian response. As he says, "All clear-cut versions of the naturalistic premise ... allribute to the personality some proper order of emotions, or of virtues and vices." Ibid. at 24. 
226 N. Noddings, Caring, A Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 
227 The ethic of care may be already interstitially recognizable in the basic structure of the welfare state, although severely bastardized, distorted, and instrumentalized by the legitimizing imperatives of the late capitalist state and relegated to second fiddle behind bureaucratic imperatives. But it may be accessible to deviationist development. 
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F. Getting too Real: The Personal and the Political Revisited 
A reflection on Unger's work over the last fifteen years 
indicates that two central themes pervade his thinking: 
contextualism and solidarity. However, their relationship has not 
been constant. It, too, has been through the throes of modernism 
a la Unger. Indeed, in Politics, it appears that, like everything else, 
they are in conflict. The unfortunate result of such a 
characterization of their relationship has been that contextualism has 
emerged triumphant. This is because the "thesis of revisability" 
insists that Unger refrain from replacing one totalizing and 
repressive conception of humanity and society with another, for that 
would be to invoke a "fantasizing, sentimental, archaic, tyrannical 
prospect of devotion to a shared vision of the common good"228 or 
what elsewhere he calls "a stifling despotism of virtue. "229 
Of course, Unger is correct to be concerned about the 
repression inherent in too thick a vision of the good society. 
However, solidarity - even in its strongest sense - does not demand 
the societal prostration that haunts Unger. Rather, solidarity 
provides direction in the form of a moral theory that requires of us 
that we respond to the needs of others at the same time as we 
assert our contextualism. As the examples of the Meech Lake 
Accord and the European petty bourgeoisie indicate, to the extent 
that contextualism smothers solidarity, that may be the extent to 
which contextualism slips into anti-democracy and, perhaps, even 
eschatology. Thus, it seems to me that Unger's vision of the good 
society, though not as anorexic as that of Rawls, is still too thin. If 
he had not abandoned his more substantive conception of solidarity, 
if he had shown some regard for the ethic of care, then he may 
have been able to avoid the repressive hegemony of a totalizing 
substantivism and, yet, have been able to provide us with an 
evaluative bench-mark - corrigible, of course - by which to measure 
our anti-necessitarism progress. 
228 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 471. 229 Critical Legal Studies, supra, note 6 at 83. 
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So, why has Unger retreated to such a radicalized neo­
proceduralism? Why has he surrendered so much critical 
reconstructive ground? There are, I think, two not unconnected 
reasons. First, although Unger is at pains to emphasize that "the 
ultimate stakes in politics are the fine texture of personal 
relations,"230 much of his analysis ( and consequently many of his 
proposals) are based upon a structural dichotomy between our 
"practical" and "passionate" lives. Thus, while Passion and a 
promised subsequent volume are focussed upon our nature and 
potential as human beings, both as individuals and as members of 
communities, Politics is primarily concerned with the reconstruction 
of social institutions. The connection, of course, is that the 
renovated institu.tional structure is designed to facilitate both our 
potentials as human beings and more open interpersonal relations.231 
However, I think this structural/discursive dichotomy has a 
substantive impact, which I fear comes perilously close to 
reproducing the old public/private dichotomy (Politics is war, Passion 
is vulnerability) that has been thoroughly criticized by both critics 
and feminists alike. 
The reason for this structural - and perhaps unintentional -
reproduction of dualistic thought, I would conjecture, is to be 
located in the politico-academic realm in which Unger finds himself. 
It's all politics, is it not? U nger's earlier work had come under 
repeated attack for its optimism, its "millenarian" tendencies, 
"utopianism," as his detractors would say.232 In Politics, Unger 
makes a serious effort to assuage the concerns of these critics by 
distinguishing between utopian and speculative thought, claiming that 
his enterprise comprises the former but not the latter. He posits 
that his approach is dependent neither on too great a change in our 
qualities as human beings, nor on too great a rupture with where we 
are now. This recanting is also related to suggestions in Politics that 
we cannot expect too much from our more extended forms of social 
interaction and that we cannot expect altruism. I agree with Unger 
23° False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 518. 
231 See, e.g., ibid. at 398. 
232 See, e.g., A Leff, Book Review of Knowledge and Politics (1977) 29 Stan. L. Rev. 
879; and E. Weinrib, "Enduring Passion" (1985) 94 Yale L.J. 1825. 
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that a progressive political programme can be easily thwarted if it is 
seen to be too idealistic. However, we must always be careful of 
not allowing those who have power from setting the terms and the 
parameters of the agenda, for that too will stymie the radical project. 
If the mature, middle-aged Unger had retained his more substantive 
conception of solidarity as outlined in his more juvenile Knowledge, 
an aspiration that dovetails with some feminists' discussions of the 
ethic of care, then the leap from here to there may not be so 
dramatic. It might only need to take into consideration a 
perspective that is already adopted, by at least some (how many?) 
women. Feminism in both theory and practice exists here and now, 
providing a vital - perhaps unique - opportunity to make the transi­
tion to the there and then. But, unfortunately, Unger ignores this 
alternative vantage point. He is too cautious, too defensive, and 
takes all too hasty a refuge in a politically problematic dichotomy 
that reduces politics to the proceduralism of plasticity. Thus, rather 
than capitulating to his pseudo-realist critics, Unger may have been 
better advised to have pursued the politics of passion inspired by the 
Atwoodian maxim of resistance: ·nolite te bastardes 
carbo,undorum. 233 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this review, I have suggested that Unger can make a 
significant contribution to a progressive politics, primarily through his 
ability to connect empowerment and anti-domination with an agenda 
for the disentrenchment of hierarchy, supplemented by both an 
impressive institutional reconstruction and the foundations for a 
freedom enhancing social theory. I have also argued that there is 
a great deal in feminism that may dovetail with the spirit of the 
Ungerian project. Most significantly, feminism's potential to provide 
an alternative vision of the norms of socio-cultural interaction and 
the possibility of historically and existentially locating the 
transgressive dynamic that can engender an empowered democracy. 
Between them, feminism and Unger provide us with an opportunity 
233 M. Atwood, The Handmaid's Tale (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1985) at 62. 
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( and that is all it is) to transcend the paradox of the Twilightenment 
with its repressive paradox of freedom embedded in domination. 
Having said that, the lacuna of not explicitly incorporating 
feminism is not merely worrisome but positively disconcerting. Not 
only is it almost incredible that a social theory developed in 1980s 
- a theory that purports to be radical to boot - can pay so little 
attention to the conditions of gender subordination. Moreover, in 
ignoring the feminist perspective, Unger has missed a fruitful radical 
opportunity to both learn and inspire. 
By way of a closing comment, although I have discussed the 
possibilities of a fruitful interchange between feminism and critical 
theory, my aim is the contemplation of a coalition, not co-option. 
Although I have suggested that there are important parallels 
between these two progressive perspectives, there are also important 
differences, primarily political differences, that cannot - and should 
not - be ignored or assumed into irrelevancy. The idea pursued 
here is something along the lines of what Iris Marion Young and 
Jesse Jackson have described as a "rainbow coalition": where 
alliances are celebrated and developed to progressive effect, while at 
the same time differences are articulated, discussed, understood, 
valued, and acted upon as a sign of progressive vibrancy and not as 
factional weaknesses.234 I think the alternative to keeping the 
conversation open between feminism and critical theory is 
depressing: sectarianism, closure, stultification, continued marginality, 
and disempowerment.235 
234 "Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral 
and Political Theory" (1986) 5 Praxis International 381 at 398. 
235 See also S. Farganis, "Social Theory and Feminist Theory: The Need for Dialogue" 
(1986) 56 Sociological Inquiry 50; N. Fraser, "What's Critical About Critical Theory? The 
Case of Habennas and Gerider" (1985) 35 New German Critique 97; and R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mi"or of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) at 378. 
